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1Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis involves the exploration of human motivations and its consequences in
certain economic situations. While the debate on what motivations drive human behavior
has its origin probably in the own origin of economics and, furthermore is also a topic
of psychology and sociology, the object of this study is to analyze certain proposals that
have recently appeared in economics. The methodology employed in this thesis will be
mainly economic theory and economic experiments. I analyze di®erent situations, both
theoretically and experimentally, in which the focus of the analysis is how subjects perceive
certain kinds of information involved in the economic situation and how the perception of
this information is used in the decision process. This rather general statement can be made
speci¯c by adding that in the type of decisions I will study issues of fairness, reciprocity
and other-regarding tendencies will be prominent.
I take into account the approach of Sen (1997) in considering the choice process
as including preferences over comprehensive outcomes and not just culmination outcomes.
2This distinction means that this study pays special attention to how an outcome is reached
to understand the behavior of individuals leading to that outcome. The process leading to
a possible outcome of the game involves information that may help agents to interpret the
situation. This information may be relevant if one is considering the possibility that agents
use reciprocity or fairness considerations.
As a convention in this thesis, the term "reciprocity" will refer to the willingness to
reward perceived good intentions and to punish perceived bad intentions, based on observed
actions. The term "fairness" will be used here in the sense of Rabin (1993) as the willingness
to reward good and to punish bad intentions in simultaneous games, where agents use beliefs.
In the notion of fairness introduced by Rabin (1993), an outcome called the "re-
ference point", used to evaluate the intentions of the other players, plays a key role. The
notion of reference point will be central in the following chapters, in particular Chapter 2,
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 that study in detail the in°uence of reference points, though not
in the strict sense of Rabin. With respect to the approach proposed by Sen (1997) this
means that these chapters are devoted to the study of menu dependence, or the role that
the menu of alternatives plays in the decision process.
This thesis employs the experimental methodology intensively to analyze the type
of questions just described. The use of experimental methods in three chapters of this thesis
is justi¯ed by the kind of question analyzed. Field data do not contain enough detail to
obtain information on how certain decisions are taken, but the type of questions I study
require this kind of information. The control that can be achieved with experiments allows
us to obtain the appropriate type of data.
3The experiments presented here share a few common properties that are standard
in this research. These properties are common elements in the literature -see for example,
Hey (1991), Davis and Holt (1993), Friedman and Sunder (1994), or Kagel and Roth (1995)
for details of the methods and procedures generally used. First, participants in experiments
are paid according to the decisions they make in the session in which they participate.
Second, no deception is introduced in any part of the experiments. Third, all subjects were
recruited from the Universitat Autonµoma de Barcelona through billboards. Fourth, the
whole series of experiments were run by hand, that is, with no computer interaction. The
¯rst three characteristics I just mentioned try to ensure that subjects have enough incen-
tives to revel their true preferences, that the subjects are con¯dent that the environment
presented is as we present it to them (moreover, this allows a kind of public good across
experiments, by setting a reputation of truthtelling in economics experiments) and that
subjects do not feel any professor-student pressure from the experimenter to make certain
decisions. The use of run-by-hand experiments can be justi¯ed by the rather simple games
used, in which not much computation is required to ¯nd out the payo®s of the agents. Cer-
tain experiments are better conducted by computer to allow a reasonable amount of time
in running the sessions, but certainly this is not case for the experiments presented in this
thesis. A computerized extension of the work presented in Chapter 5 is planned.
Another common characteristic of the experiments presented here is the relatively
simple structure of the decisions that subjects are asked to make. Since the subjects used
in the sessions presented here had no previous experience with experiments, and most of
them were not students from economics or business administration, special care was given
4to ensure comprehension of the decisions tasks and the environment presented to them.
The instructions for Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 are included in the respective appendix of
these chapters.1
In Chapter 2, (On Rabin's Concept of Fairness and the Private Provision of Public
Goods) I consider the implications of the Rabin (1993) theory of fairness for the private
provision of public goods through the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism where agents
have continuous strategies. This model involves a modelization of a concept of fairness
based on experimental results. The notion of fairness introduced implies the willingness
to reward good intentions and to punish bad intentions. Evaluation of the intentions from
other players need beliefs on what others will do and beliefs on what other players belief that
the reaction to their actions will be. These beliefs on other players' actions are evaluated in
terms of a reference point. Rabin (1993) set this reference point as the midpoint between
those outcomes that are Pareto E±cient. Another way to put this is that every agent
beliefs that she deserves half of the amount she can share with the other player, given
Pareto E±ciency. I allow for a general reference point in this model to incorporate di®erent
subjective notions of fairness. For example allowing an individual who beliefs that she
deserves everything. This model is used for the problem of the private provision of public
goods because this area contains a vast amount of experimental results and because these
results have been debated with respect to what notion of individual behavior can account for
it. The standard setting involves several players that have the opportunity to make private
contributions to one public good out of a private good. The characteristics of the situation
1The instructions for Chapter 4 are not included since they are the same as the ones in Chapter 3 but
for the speci¯c games used.
5are that the dominant strategy for each player is contributing nothing to the public good,
while e±ciency would require full contribution of the private resources to the public good
production.2
Two main results are analyzed in detail, the so called splitting, or the observed
behavior by which subjects contribute between 40% to 60% of their private resources to the
public good (particularly in initial periods or in one-shot games) and what is known as the
MPCR e®ect3. As the main results of this chapter, we observe that the model introduced by
Rabin (1993) is able to explain splitting in the linear model as well as in a non-linear model
with two players as a compromise between the private interest and the psychological part of
the utility function, but does not rule out other equilibria not consistent with experimental
data. The model fails to predict correctly the e®ect of the MPCR on contributions, one
of the most accepted pieces of evidence in the ¯eld. These results question the suitability
of using this model, even in the environments which are closer to its requirements, say
simultaneous games of two players.
In Chapter 3 (Reference Points and Negative Reciprocity in Simple Sequential
Games, joint work with Jordi Brandts) we investigate experimentally whether preferences
over an outcome depend on what other possible outcomes of the situation under considera-
tion are, i.e. whether choices are "menu dependent". In simple sequential games we analyze
whether reactions to a certain benchmark outcome are in°uenced by changes in the payo®s
of another outcome, not attainable at that time, the reference point. The change to sequen-
tial games with respect to Chapter 2 is originated by the fact that since Rabin's model of
2See Ledyard (1995) for a complete description of the environment, which can also be found in detail in
Chapter 2.
3This concept was introduced and analyzed in experiments ¯rst by Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984).
6fairness could not account for the most accepted results in the most favorable environment, a
di®erent approach could generate data to identify whether the notion of intentions detection
and the use of it was reasonable. As a ¯rst step, a sequential game in which the control over
perceptions was relatively high is a direct instrument to analyze whether agents perceive
certain intentions and whether this a®ects their behavior. Our data provide evidence that
is favorable to the notion of menu dependence. Alterations of the reference point can lead
to quantitatively signi¯cant changes in behavior at the benchmark outcome. The behavior
we observe can be interpreted in terms of negative reciprocity. That is, the reference points
we use in the di®erent games a®ect subjects' reciprocity considerations toward the same
alternative proposed by other players, suggesting that subjects may attribute a di®erent
intention to the same proposal depending on the reference point available.
In Chapter 4 (Distributional Concerns and Reference Points ) I analyze whether
the degree of negative reciprocity in players' actions is a®ected by certain payo® changes
at a reference point in two-person games similar to the ones analyzed in chapter 3. These
changes correspond to variations in the relative payo® of one player at the reference point, in
the absolute payo® and in both players' payo®s. These variations were not analyzed in the
previous chapter and try to disentangle which speci¯c information contained in the reference
point generates the kind of behavior observed in Chapter 3. Relative payo® considerations
were analyzed by Bolton (1991) and proposed as a key element to understanding bargaining
behavior in experiments. E±ciency considerations, on the other hand, were at the center of
the debate around the di®erent results obtained in ultimatum games and best-shot games4.
In this series of experiments I do observe high levels of negative reciprocity for the di®erent
4GÄuth and Tietz (1991)
7games but none of the manipulations introduced a®ects signi¯cantly the level of negative
reciprocity across games. This negative result may be the consequence of the conservative
approach adopted in the design. The small measure of the payo® manipulations introduced
in this chapter (in comparison to the manipulations introduced in the previous chapter) are
a possible cause of the lack of impact on the subjects' behavior.
The research presented in Chapter 5 (The Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: Reci-
procity and Group Size E®ects) studies the e®ect of social information, instead of outcome
information, as a reference point. This possible e®ect is called, in the spirit of Sen's termi-
nology, number dependence. The hypothesis is that reciprocity considerations could emerge
and be modi¯ed by a social process of sequential interaction among a number of agents.
To study this hypothesis, I analyze a di®erent environment in which positive reciprocity
may play a role. Sequential prisoners' dilemma games may be interpreted as formalizations
of many everyday situations that involve a trade-o® between the private and the collective
interest. Sequentiality in the interaction between people is a feature that seems more ap-
propriate as a representation of the type of situations one wants to study than the perhaps
more standard case of simultaneous decisions. The prisoner's dilemma game is a simple,
structured instrument to approach these problems and additionally allows us to study fun-
damental behavioral questions. We study in detail what predictions one could obtain for
this situation from two types of models of individual behavior: inequality aversion concerns
[Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)] and altruism [Ledyard (1995)]. We run experimental sessions
of the two-person and the three-person sequential prisoner's dilemma game and we observe
that neither a model of inequality aversion concerns, nor the altruism model proposed fully
8accommodate the data. Our data, however, is consistent with general reciprocity consider-
ations by individuals in each game. Moreover, comparing the two games, we do observe a
pattern that could be interpreted as a group size e®ect in the sense that more cooperative
actions seem to increase the perceived obligation to reciprocate with cooperation. If this
direction could be con¯rmed statistically by replication, it would point to the in°uence of
social interaction as a reference point in decisions.
9Chapter 2
On Rabin's Concept of Fairness
and the Private Provision of Public
Goods
2.1 Introduction
This paper is aimed at connecting theoretical with experimental research. Re-
cently, several models have incorporated evidence from experimental data to get more ac-
curate descriptions of behavior. These papers present speci¯c modelizations of reciprocity.
A seminal paper in this direction is Rabin (1993), which incorporates a concept of fairness as
an argument in the utility function of individuals. This paper is one of the most in°uential
in the literature and key to understanding the posterior directions.
Here we will take a close look at Rabin's model of fairness and analyze it in the
10
context of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM). This will allow us to be precise
in what refers to the model of fairness and its applicability.
In an experimental linear VCM each individual in a group is asked to make an
allocation of her resources between a private account and a public account, with the charac-
teristic that investing in the private account is individually rational but the e±cient outcome
implies investing everything in the public account. This decision is made, typically, privately
and without any information about the decision of the other members in the group. Among
others, Marwell and Ames (1980), Isaac and Walker (1988a, 1988b and 1991) Isaac, Walker
and Thomas (1984) and Isaac, Walker and Williams (1994) are experiments that report
results in this kind of setting. One common result is that people contribute more to the
public account than expected. Based on the payo® function as a representation of the true
utility function and standard notions of rationality and information, standard analysis pre-
dicts that agents should not allocate any resources to the public account. Ledyard (1995)
considers that a standard experimental result is what he refers to as "splitting", contribut-
ing to the public account an amount of resources between 40% and 60%. This apparent
failure of the standard model can be explained by alternative theories. In the literature
there are two main kind of theories, those that consider that partial contributions are due
to the use of one-shot experiments, thus ruling out learning, and those theories that pro-
vide alternative models of behavior to explain splitting. Among the latter we could include
altruism, reciprocity or fairness.
Ledyard (1995) refers to fairness, in a general sense, as a factor that remains to
be studied further. Theories presented by him as ¯rsts attempts to deal with this issue are
11
based on the concepts of group identi¯cation and status. Agents consider themselves with
the right to be as well o® as the others are. Unfortunately, these theories do not explain the
behavior observed in experiments. The fundamental problem is that they can not explain
why individuals split their endowments between the private and the public account.
Rabin (1993) models a speci¯c concern for fairness by individuals that interact in
economic processes. The formal approach is close to that of psychological games introduced
by Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989), in which agents incorporate in their utility
function beliefs on what others will do, beliefs on the beliefs of others, and so on. In this
way it is possible to study games with a di®erent perspective, introducing psychological
phenomena. Rabin (1993) uses this approach to introduce a formalization on how agents
apply fairness considerations, relying on the idea that fairness considerations are based on
evaluations of the other agents' intentions. To evaluate intentions, agents must have some
beliefs on what others will do and what others believe. A main assumption is that agents
have a subjective notion of what they should obtain from participating in an economic
activity. This notion, plus the expectations on the others' actions and the evaluation of the
others' intentions may generate a behavior that deviates from the standard assumptions.
Depending on the outcome that agents think they will get and the perceived intentions of
the other players, they react behaving kindly or unkindly to others, even in cases where this
implies to sacri¯ce their own material well-being. Rabin speci¯es that these psychological
components will play an important role as the material costs associated to certain decisions
are not large. These speci¯cations are justi¯ed based on experimental studies like those of
Kahneman, Knetsh and Thaler (1986a, 1986b).
12
Rabin analyzes two player normal form games with ¯nite strategy spaces. We will
apply Rabin's model of fairness to the speci¯c problem of the private provision of public
goods through a VCM. This problem may be interpreted as a generalization of the prisoner's
dilemma because the strategic interaction is the same.
What we present in this paper is a generalization of Rabin's theory to a speci¯c
area of research for which we have extensive experimental data. This will allow us to
test whether this theory is consistent with several features of the empirical evidence. We
introduce one variation into Rabin's model that will allow us to accommodate more patterns
of behavior. Rabin considers that agents have a "reference point", an outcome that they
consider fair. This outcome consists of sharing equally along the Pareto Frontier. We go
beyond this and consider that agents may have other ideas of what is fair for them. Agents
may believe that they deserve more than half the pie, because of a self-centered perspective
or maybe because they claim some property rights. Whatever the reason, we do not rule out
a ¯fty-¯fty split, we just include other possibilities that may allow us to interpret observed
behavior.
In this paper we will analyze whether this generalization of Rabin's model of fair-
ness is able to explain why splitting occurs. Additionally, we will study the relation between
the contributions to the public account and theMarginal Per Capita Return (MPCR), which
measures the ratio of the bene¯t in increased returns from the group account to the op-
portunity cost in foregone returns from the individual exchange. This relation is important
because it is a stylized fact in the literature that the MPCR is positively related to the
level of contributions to the public account. Experimental papers that study this relations
13
are, among others, Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984), Isaac and Walker (1988a) and Isaac,
Walker and Williams (1994).
We also discuss the e®ects of heterogeneities in endowments and in the MPCR
between individuals. We conjecture that if individuals care about the fairness of the outcome
and the intentions of the other player, di®erent endowments or di®erent returns from the
technologies of the economy may lead to di®erent considerations of what every agent should
contribute and, therefore, to disagreement and less cooperation. The experimental evidence
about this conjecture is not clear. An experimental study on the e®ect of heterogeneities in
MPCR is Fisher, Isaac, Schatzberg and Walker (1995). These authors ¯nd no clear e®ect
of this kind of heterogeneity in the sense just described but they identify di®erent patterns
of behavior for individuals that face di®erent MPCR. Brandts and Schram (1996), with a
di®erent design, also fail to ¯nd evidence in favor of the e®ects in contribution levels across
individuals due to heterogeneities in MPCR.
Finally, we apply our analysis to the case of a non-linear VCM. In this kind of
environment the dominant strategy is to contribute some amount of resources to the public
account, instead of contributing nothing to the public account. This case is interesting
because it has been suggested that observed contributions in experiments may be the result
of errors by agents. That is, every error in a decision may be incorrectly interpreted as an
intentional contribution to the public good, see Ledyard (1995) and Andreoni (1995). This
interpretation has been tested experimentally by Keser (1996), introducing a design with
an interior dominant strategy while keeping as the e±cient outcome the full contribution
of resources to the public account. She ¯nds that agents contribute to the public account
14
more resources than the dominant strategy prediction. We analyze whether the fairness
equilibrium concept is consistent with this evidence.
2.2 Fairness and the Private Provision of Public Goods
We present the problem of a public good that can be provided through the volun-
tary contributions of two agents. Our objective in this section is to show that there exists
an equilibrium where both players split their initial endowments between the private and
the public account using the framework proposed by Rabin (1993).
We consider two individuals that have the possibility to simultaneously allocate
their endowments between a public account or a private account.
The public good account yields to each individual the return:
y =
a
2
2X
i=1
xi =
a
2
2X
i=1
(zi¡ ti) (2.1)
The quantity allocated to the private account is ti, zi is the agent's endowment,
xi 2 [0; zi] = Si is the quantity allocated to the public account and a is the return that the
group receives from each unit invested in the public good. The private account yields to
agent i the return pi¢ ti, with pi > 0: The monetary payo® to agent i can be summarized
with the function:
¼i(xi; xj) = pi(zi ¡xi) + a2 (xi + xj): (2.2)
We are interested in the case in which the parameters are such that the unique
dominant strategy for each player will be to contribute nothing to the public account. This
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is the same as requiring:
MPCRi =
a
2
pi
< 1; i = 1;2: (Assumption 1)
This means that the investment in the private account yields a higher return than
the one that could be obtained by investing in the public account. If this is the case,
every purely self-interested player will invest everything in the private account, whatever
the action of the other player.
As a second feature we desire the game to have as e±cient outcome both players
contributing everything to the public good, that is, (x1;x2) = (z1; z2): In this case, the
amount of public good produced is Y = a ¢ (z1 + z2) : To ¯nd the e±cient outcome of the
game, we solve the following standard problem:
maxx1;x2 p1 (z1 ¡ x1) + p2 (z2 ¡ x2) + a (x1 + x2)
s:t: : x1 2 [0; z1] ; x2 2 [0; z2]
The solution to this problem is x1 = z1; x2 = z2 if a > p1 and a > p2: This de¯nes
our second assumption.
a > pi; i = 1;2: (Assumption 2)
Observe that what we require is that what agents can obtain collectively will be
higher when they fully invest their resources in the public account.
The analysis provided identi¯es utility with payo®. Now we will enrich this setting
by assuming that agents may have a utility function that incorporates other issues, apart
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from the material payo®. This utility function will incorporate fairness components and the
speci¯c modelization was introduced by Rabin (1993). Hence, the utility function for agent
i = 1;2 is given by:
Ui (xi; exj ; bxi) = X ¢ ¼i(xi; exj) + efj (exj ; bxi) [1 + fi (xi; exj)] : (2.3)
Agent's i strategy is denoted by xi; exj is the strategy that player i believes that
player j will play and bxi is the strategy that agent i believes that agent j believes will be her
strategy. The material payo® that agent i expects from choosing strategy xi and believing
that j will play exj is ¼i (xi; exj). The parameter X > 0 is the scale of the game. Notice that
X does not alter the strategic interaction, the scale a®ects equally the private account and
the public account.
The functions fi (xi; exj) and efj (exj ; bxi) are the kindness functions for agent i. The
function fi (xi; exj) re°ects how kind agent i is being to agent j by playing xi if she expects
agent j playing exj: On the other hand, efj (exj ; bxi) expresses agent i's beliefs about how kind
agent j is treating her if she expects agent j playing exj and believing that she will play bxi.
Rabin (1993) proposes a particular form for these functions, speci¯cally are de¯ned as:
fi (xi; exj) = ¼j (exj ;xi) ¡ ¼ej (exj)¼hj (exj) ¡ ¼minj (exj) (2.4)
efj (exj ; bxi) = ¼i (bxi; exj) ¡¼ei (bxi)¼hi (bxi) ¡ ¼mini (bxi) (2.5)
Notice that these kindness functions express that agent i thinks that she is treating
j kindly (fi (xi; exj) > 0) if she is playing a strategy such that j obtains a higher payo®
17
than a reference point payo®, ¼ej (exj) (de¯ned later), and this kindness is normalized with
the explicit intention to get bounded functions. The fact that these kindness functions are
bounded captures the fact that psychological considerations will have less importance in the
utility function as the material payo® part of the utility function increases. To construct
the speci¯c kindness functions we need to give a speci¯c form to the reference point payo®
mentioned above. In order to do so, consider ¯rst the set of payo®s that both agents can
get if agent i plays xi and she believes that j will play exj :
¦(exj) = (X ¢ ¼i(xi; exj);X ¢ ¼j(xi; exj)) ; xi 2 [0; zi] : (2.6)
From this set we select the following payo®s that agent i believes she is giving
to j. The maximum payo® attainable by j is ¼hj (exj) = X £pj(zj ¡ exj) + a2(zi + exj)¤ ; that
is, when agent i contributes everything to the public account. The minimum payo® j can
get is obtained when agent i contributes nothing to the public account, in this case the
payo® to j is ¼minj (exj) = X £pj(zj ¡ exj) + a2exj¤ : To obtain the equitable payo®, ¼ej (exj) ;
we need to look ¯rst for the lowest payo® to agent j among the Pareto e±cient points in
the set ¦(exj) : Observe that in our environment PE (¦(exj)) = ¦ (exj) because any increase
(decrease) in i's contribution lowers (raises) her own payo® and increases (decreases) j's
payo®. Consequently, ¼lj (exj) = ¼minj (exj) : Now we de¯ne the equitable payo® as a convex
combination of the lowest payo® and the highest payo®, that is, each agent believes that
she should obtain a share ® of PE (¦(exj)) ; consequently the other agent, j, should obtain
(1 ¡ ®) : Hence ¼ej (exj) = X £pj(zj ¡ exj) + a2 ((1 ¡ ®) zi + exj)¤ ;® 2 [0;1] : That is, agent
i believes that in order to give the equitable payo® to agent j, she should contribute to
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the public account the amount (1 ¡ ®) zi: Notice that ¼ei (bxi) ; on the other hand, will
be ¼ei (bxi) = Xpi(zi ¡ bxi) + X a2(bxi + ®zj);® 2 [0;1] : Rabin (1993) de¯nes the equitable
payo® as the midpoint between the lowest payo® and the highest payo®, both de¯ned
in the text. We prefer to extend the concept to a more general consideration of what
an individual believes that is fair for him to obtain as a reference point. In this case,
¼ej (exj) = (1 ¡ ®)¼hj (exj) + ®¼lj (exj) : The kindness functions for agent i turns out to be:
fi (xi; exj) = xizi ¡ (1 ¡®) 2 [¡ (1 ¡®) ;®] (2.7)
efj (exj; bxi) = exjzj ¡ ® 2 [¡®;1 ¡®] (2.8)
The functions for agent j are symmetric. Hence, agent i thinks that she is being
nice to j when she is contributing to the public account a share of her resources that exceeds
what she believes that agent j deserves, 1 ¡®: On the other hand, she believes that agent
j is being kind to her when j is contributing a share greater than the share that i believes
that she deserves, ®: Notice that a high ® implies that, for the same level of contribution,
agent i thinks that is being nicer to agent j. For the same reason, a high ® implies that
agent i will perceive the contributions of agent j as less generous. That is, a high ® means
being very demanding to the other agent and highly satis¯ed of one's own behavior. The
implications of this extension of Rabin's equitable payo® in equilibrium behavior will be
discussed further.
The utility function of agent i, therefore, can be now fully speci¯ed according to
these derivations.
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Ui (xi; exj ; bxi) = X ¢ ¦i(xi; exj) + µexjzj ¡ ®
¶·
1 +
xi
zi
¡ (1 ¡®)
¸
(2.9)
The equilibrium analysis will follow the de¯nition of fairness equilibrium by Rabin
(1993). This equilibrium will be the result of both players maximizing her utility function
and imposing rational expectations in the beliefs about the other agent and higher order
beliefs. Formally we state:
De¯nition 1 (Rabin 1993): The pair of strategies (x¤1;x¤2) 2 (S1; S2) is a fairness equilib-
rium if, for i=1,2, j6= i;
i) x¤i 2 arg maxxi2Si Ui (xi; exj; bxi)
ii) bxi = exj = x¤i
Without loss of generality, we suppose that
¡
pi ¡ a2
¢
zi ¸ ¡pj ¡ a2¢ zj (or equiva-
lently, (1 ¡ MPCRi)pizi ¸ (1 ¡ MPCRj)pjzj) , that is, the net gain from investing the
whole resources in the private account is greater or equal for agent i than for j. This will
be useful to organize the results.The following proposition describes the equilibria of this
model that will be characterized by the relevant parameters.
Proposition 2 i) If X (1 ¡ MPCRi)pizi < 1 ¡ ®, there exist three types of equilibria. a)
An equilibrium where both players contribute their whole endowment to the public account,
x¤i = zi and x¤j = zj : b) An equilibrium with both agents contributing a positive amount
x¤i =
£
X
¡
pj ¡ a2
¢
zj + ®
¤
zi; i = 1; 2; j 6= i. c) An equilibrium with both agents contributing
nothing to the public account.
ii) If X (1 ¡MPCRi)pizi = 1¡®; there exist two types of equilibria. a) Equilibria
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with x¤j = zj and xi 2
£¡
X
¡
pj ¡ a2
¢
zj + ®
¢
zi; zi
¤
: b) An equilibrium with both agents
contributing nothing to the public account.
iii) If X (1 ¡ MPCRi)pizi > 1 ¡®; the unique equilibrium is the one where both
agents contribute nothing to the public account.
Proof: See the Appendix
The interpretation of these results follows from standard analysis including the
characteristics of the utility function that we consider. An agent will be willing to contribute
one more unit to the public account if the marginal bene¯ts of doing so compensate the
losses. That is,
X
a
2
+
· exj
zj
¡®
¸
1
zi
> Xpi (2.10)
The left hand side of this inequality expresses the marginal gain to agent i from
contributing one unit if he expects that agent j will contribute exj : Notice that the sources
of these marginal bene¯ts are, on one hand, the return from the public account and, on
the other hand, the consideration by agent i of what j is doing for her. This consideration
will be positive if agent j contributes a share of her endowment in excess of the reference
point that i considers she deserves for herself. Moreover this consideration will be mitigated
by the endowment of agent i. That is, a relatively high endowment to agent i will mean
that j will have to contribute more to the public account in order to push i to contribute.
This is also true when observing the right hand side of this inequality. Agent j will have to
compensate a higher private return of agent i by contributing more.
The previous inequality may be manipulated in order to understand how equilib-
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rium behavior is derived.
· exj
zj
¡®
¸
> X (1 ¡MPCRi)pizi (2.11)
The maximum level of kindness that i can expect from j is 1 ¡ ®. Hence, when
this level exceeds the monetary costs of contributing, cooperation is possible. If we had an
equality, as in case ii) in Proposition 2, then the psychological gains from cooperation com-
pensate the monetary costs just if i expects full cooperation from j. Finally, if the maximum
psychological payo® is smaller than the cost of cooperation, no equilibrium with positive
contributions survives. Therefore, when the right hand side of Equation (2.11) increases,
we change to cases where less cooperation is possible or a case where no cooperation is the
unique equilibrium.
A feature that may be disturbing is the presence of the full free riding outcome
in every case. In fact, its robustness is due to the nature of the fairness concept. Consider
one equilibrium with zero contributions to the public account. If one player is contributing
nothing to the public account, the other agent interprets that she is being treated unkindly.
If this player changes her strategy, this change will both reduce her material payo® as well
as her psychological payo®, letting the other agent hurt him without reacting to it. Observe
that this is true for any scale of the game because the material and the psychological interest
go in the same direction.
On the other hand, optimal provision of the public good turns out to be also a
fairness equilibrium when the monetary parameters are su±ciently small. If both players
know that they are playing this equilibrium, a unilateral deviation would lead the deviator
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to increase her material payo® while reducing her psychological payo®. Observe that the
other player is giving her the maximum psychological bene¯t, hence a reduction in the
contribution implies to give the other player a smaller psychological bene¯t reducing at the
same time her own payo® because an agent prefers being nice when the other player is being
nice to her.
Finally, intermediate contributions by both agents is also an equilibrium for small
values of the material parameters. A deviation from any agent of this equilibrium towards
a higher contribution to the public account leads to a decrease in the material bene¯ts
that does not compensate her for the higher psychological utility of being nicer to the
other agent. Reducing her contribution neither compensates the psychological loss with the
higher material bene¯ts. Observe that, as the scale of the payo®, the return from the private
account or the endowment increase and the MPCR decreases, this equilibrium exists with
higher levels of contribution to compensate the material losses of contributing to the public
account. This observation is important because it contradicts one of the most common
observations in experimental games. Hence, we provide a formal statement in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 Given the conditions in which the equilibrium with intermediate contribu-
tions exists, X (1 ¡ MPCRi)pizi < 1 ¡®; these intermediate contributions increase in the
scale of the payo®s, X; the endowments, the return from the private account of the other
agent, the reference point ® and decrease with increases in the return from the public ac-
count.
Proof: See the Appendix.
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This proposition states a result that is contradictory with evidence found in the
experimental literature. Recall that the MPCR is an increasing function of a, the return
from the public account. It is a stylized fact in the literature that as the MPCR increases,
the individual contributions to the public account increase. The reason to obtain this result
in the model is that a higher MPCR induces one agent to require less contribution from
the other agent in order to contribute herself, since a higher MPCR increases the monetary
bene¯ts from contributing to the public account and, consequently, less cooperation to
satisfy the psychological needs is required. As a result, in equilibrium both agents contribute
less to the public account if their MPCR increase.
2.3 Fairness and Experiments
In order to discuss other empirical evidence in the experimental literature and
the capacity of Rabin's model to predict them, we will consider di®erent simple cases with
respect to the parameters.
The ¯rst simpli¯cation would be to consider two identical individuals. In this case
observe that the most interesting result is that the model predicts, for small values of X, p,
z the possibility of splitting. In fact, this result is repeatedly observed in experiments with
simultaneous moves, on the other hand, the model does not predict correctly the MPCR
e®ect as shown in several experiments, as those of Isaac and Walker (1988) and Isaac,
Walker and Williams (1994).
Consider now the case where agents di®er just in endowments, we can consider
zi > zj : This kind of heterogeneity has not been exhaustively analyzed experimentally.
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However, it is mentioned as one factor that experimentalists expect that will hurt coopera-
tion. Proposition 2 and 3 apply here making the relevant simpli¯cations. Observe that in
this case, when the equilibrium with intermediate contributions occur, agent i contributes
more than agent j, but this agent contributes more relatively to her endowment. The rea-
son being that agent j has to make more e®ort to compensate agent i for her contribution.
There are more di®erences with respect to a homogeneous case. The agent with higher
endowment requires some level of cooperation from agent j in order to compensate her for
the material loss when she contributes to the public account. This level of cooperation may
not be a®ordable for j given her own endowment. As a consequence, when cooperation is
possible at intermediate levels, agent j contributes relatively more. The conclusion of the
model, hence, is that heterogeneities in endowments would a®ect individual behavior.
A di®erent possibility for contrasting the model with experimental data is to con-
sider the case where agents are identical except with respect to the MPCR. Ledyard (1995)
suggests it as one factor that may hurt cooperation, however some results fail to ¯nd support
for this suggestion1. Consider the case where both agents are homogeneous but pi > pj ; i.e.
agent i has a lower MPCR. Notice that the statements in Proposition 2 still hold with the
opportune changes in the parameters and that agent i's parameters are the relevant ones
to obtain cooperation. This occurs because for cooperation to appear, agent j has to be
able to compensate the opportunity cost for agent i of contributing, higher for agent i that
receives a higher return from the private account. Observe also that, whenever intermediate
contributions do exist, agent j contributes more agent i does. This is consistent with results
1Brandts ans Schram (1996) have tested it with no relevant di®erences in individual contributions with re-
spect to an homogeneous group. Fisher, Isaac Schatzberg and Walker (1995) neither ¯nd evidence suggesting
a decrease in contributions due to heterogeneities in MPCR.
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found by Fisher, Isaac, Schatzberg and Walker (1995). This consistency of the model with
individual behavior is weakened by another experimental result in the same paper. Fisher,
Isaac, Schatzberg and Walker (1995) compare the levels of contribution to the public ac-
count of individuals in a group composed of individuals of the same type (types de¯ned
by their MPCR). They ¯nd that there exist di®erences in behavior and this would mean
that, at an individual level, agents behave di®erently depending on the MPCR of the other
agents in the group. The model presented here also shares this characteristic. Consider a
homogeneous group with private return equal to pi (we will call this a "low MPCR" group)
and the condition that allows intermediate contribution, X (1 ¡MPCRi)piz < 1 ¡®: The
level of contribution of each agent is:
x¤i = x¤j =
h
X
³
pi¡ a2
´
z + ®
i
z (Homogeneous group, low MPCR) (2.12)
Consider now the case where both agents di®er in their MPCR and consider the
level of contribution that the agent with low MPCR (agent i) makes in the equilibrium with
intermediate contributions. This level of contribution corresponds to:
x¤i =
h
X
³
pj ¡ a2
´
z +®
i
z (Heterogeneous group, agent with low MPCR) (2.13)
Since pi > pj ; the agent with low MPCR behaves di®erently depending on whether
the other agent shares the same MPCR or not. The experiment mentioned shows that, when
participating in mixed groups (where groups just di®er by their MPCR) the low MPCR
agents contribute to a higher degree than do their equivalents in homogeneous groups with
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low MPCR: We have shown that, however, the model by Rabin predicts the opposite.
The agent with low MPCR in a heterogeneous group contributes less than an agent in a
homogeneous group of low MPCR agents. This is so in the model because low MPCR
agents have less incentives to contribute to the public account and, consequently, when
cooperation appears, the high MPCR individual makes a higher e®ort (by contributing
more) to get cooperation.
At an aggregate level, Rabin's model ¯ts another piece of evidence observed in
Fisher, Isaac, Schatzberg and Walker (1995). These authors observe that, at an aggregate
level, there are no di®erences in the total provision of the public good due to the presence of
heterogeneities. We can apply their method to check whether Rabin's model maintains this
characteristic. They test whether the provision of the public good in a heterogeneous group
would be some average of the contributions of two groups, one composed of low MPCR
agent and the other composed of high MPCR agents. In the model, we do observe that we
reach the same conclusion: aggregate behavior is not a®ected by heterogeneities2. Notice,
¯nally, that the MPCR e®ect in this case would follow the general proposition, although no
empirical evidence of this e®ect in the presence of heterogeneities exists.
2.4 A slightly di®erent environment
We will introduce in this section an environment where the payo® from the private
account for each individual it is not anymore a linear function. The reason to introduce
2The method consists of summing up the contributions in a heterogeneous group (that di®ers just in
MPCR) and considering the intermediate contributions in two homogeneous groups, one of them with
MPCRi and the other with MPCRj. Summing these contributions and ¯nding the average, one can
observe that the di®erence with the aggregate contribution in the heterogeneous group is zero.
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this change is that it has been argued that, if the dominant strategy is in the corner (as it
happens in the linear VCM), then it might be that contributions to the public account are
due to errors of the players that, by the structure of the game, are interpreted as intentional
cooperative behavior. This interpretation, if correct, would mean that the experiments with
the linear VCM do not justify modelizations incorporating fairness. Keser (1996) tested
this hypothesis constructing an example that generates as a dominant strategy an interior
solution and where e±ciency requires contributing the whole endowment to the public
account. In this setting, the experiment shows that subjects contribute more than the
dominant strategy. Hence, the interpretation of contributions due to errors is questioned.
However, it remains to explain why subjects contribute. Fairness considerations may be part
of the explanation to it and, therefore, Rabin's model could accommodate this evidence.
The environment designed by Keser (1996) is a simultaneous one-shot game played
by two identical agents that have to decide how to allocate their resources between a private
and a public account. Considering the notation introduced before, the material payo®s are
de¯ned as follows:
¼i(xi;xj) = A(z ¡xi) ¡ (z ¡xi)2 + B(xi + xj); i = 1;2; j 6= i: (2.14)
The parameters have to satisfy two conditions. First, the dominant strategy for
each individual maximizing her own material payo® has to be an interior solution where
each agent contributes to the public account less than half her endowment3. The conditions
3Keser (1996) sets the parameters in this way to avoid the middle contribution point because it is a
prominent outcome. However, with her model, if one observes overcontributions it might be because people
tend to go to the prominent outcome. The solution to this possible problem with her data would be to
generate a dominant strategy equilibrium to contribute already more than half their endowment. After this
change, if we observed overcontribution, the explanation of subjects tending to make a decision that goes to
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that we need to impose on the parameters to get this characteristic and that the e±cient
outcome will be full contribution, plus a condition to ensure that the MPCR is positive
are:
z
2
> z ¡ A ¡B
2
= z ¡ D > 0 > z ¡ A
2
> z ¡B: (Assumption 3)
The dominant strategy for agent i = 1; 2 is contributing to the public account the
amount z¡D: The kindness functions are constructed as in the linear model noting that the
set of Pareto E±cient payo®s is PE (¦(exj)) = f(¼i (xi; exj) ; ¼j (xi; exj)) s:t: xi 2 [z ¡D;z]g :
Hence, the kindness functions for agent i = 1;2 are in this case:
fi (xi; exj) = xi ¡ (z ¡®D)z
efj (exj ; bxi) = exj ¡ (z ¡ (1 ¡ ®)D)z (2.15)
These kindness functions share the same characteristics that those in the linear
model, they are continuous and bounded. Observe that the kindness of agent i to agent j is
an increasing function of her contribution to the public account and that this kindness will
take higher values for higher values of ®: The fairness consideration for i of what j is doing
is also an increasing function of the contribution that i expects from j and a decreasing
function of ®: The utility function for agent i = 1; 2 is:
Ui (xi; exj ; bxi) = X ¢ ¦i(xi; exj) + exj ¡ (z ¡ (1 ¡ ®)D)z
·
1 +
xi ¡ (z ¡®D)
z
¸
(2.16)
the prominent outcome is ruled out.
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The equilibrium in this case will be described in the following proposition and uses
De¯nition 1 stated before.
Proposition 4 i) If X · 1¡®2z2 there exist three types of equilibrium: a) An equilibrium
where both agents contribute nothing to the public account, x¤i = x¤j = 0: b) An equilibrium
where both agents contribute their whole endowment to the public account, x¤i = x¤j = z: c)
An equilibrium with intermediate contributions. In this equilibrium with splitting, the quan-
tities allocated to the public account are larger than at the Dominant Strategy Equilibrium.
x¤i = x¤j = z ¡D ¡ ®D2Xz2 ¡ 1
ii) If 1¡®2z2 < X · z¡(1¡®)D2z2(z¡D) there exists one equilibrium where agents contribute
nothing to the public account, x¤i = x¤j = 0:
iii) If z¡(1¡®)D2z2(z¡D) < X there exists a unique interior equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
the quantities allocated to the public account are:
x¤i = x¤j = z ¡ D ¡ ®D2Xz2 ¡ 1 < z ¡ D
Notice that lim
X!1x
¤
i = z ¡ D:
Proof: See the Appendix.
This proposition shows that, for su±ciently small payo®s, there exist multiplicity
of equilibria. Observe that in the ¯rst situation, there is an equilibrium with no contribution
to the public account. In this equilibrium both agents hurt themselves as well as they do
hurt the other agent. No one wants to deviate because, by doing so, the deviator would
increase her monetary payo®, but she would reduce simultaneously her psychological payo®.
Given the scale of the game in situation i), this would result in a total decrease in her
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utility function. In the full contribution equilibrium any deviator would increase again her
monetary payo® but reducing her psychological payo®. For this scale of the game there
exists also an intermediate contributions equilibrium. In this equilibrium the quantities
allocated to the public account are larger than in the DSE, in line with results found
in Keser. Observe also that, as the scale of the payo®s increases this equilibrium would
need more contributions to the public account, until it converged to the full contributions
outcome. The change to the second situation of the proposition leads to ruling out also
the full contribution equilibrium. Given the scale of the game and supposing that ® > :5;
the unique equilibrium that incorporates psychological factors, negative ones, is the no
contribution equilibrium. In the last case of the proposition (case iii), this equilibrium is
no longer possible because the psychological factor, recall the boundedness of the kindness
functions, is even less important, leading to the convergence to the DSE. As it could be
expected, as the scale of the payo®s tends to in¯nity, the unique equilibrium will approach
the DSE equilibrium because the psychological part of the utility function will play a residual
role and, hence, the material part of the utility function will determine the equilibrium.
The model predicts an intermediate contribution equilibrium with overcontribu-
tions, as Keser found. This result, hence is consistent with experimental data, but it should
be stressed that the model presents multiplicity of equilibria for this case. Moreover, as the
scale of the game is higher, the results do not justify overcontributions but on the contrary,
predict smaller contributions.
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2.5 Conclusions
In this paper we present an analysis of the private provision of public goods through
voluntary contributions. We use a model of fairness presented by Rabin (1993) that incorpo-
rates psychological issues into the utility function in order to accommodate some evidences
of the experimental literature. This model is intensively cited in the literature but has
not been analyzed in detail to check its consistency with the main stylized facts in the
literature. Here we provide an generalization of the model that allows us to show that, in
the standard VCM, intermediate cooperation levels are possible, consistently with results
repeteadly found in the experimental literature, when the material stakes of the game are
su±ciently small. This consistency happens whether the players are identical or di®er in en-
dowments, MPCR or both. This result is satisfactory, but there are more pieces of evidence
in the literature that are also important, in particular, what is known as the MPCR e®ect.
The model presented does not predict the positive correlation between MPCR and contri-
butions to the public good. In fact, the model would predict a negative correlation. This
negative result is independent of analyzing the model with homogeneous or heterogeneous
individuals.
If we just consider heterogeneities in MPCR, we have found consistency of the
model with the available experimental evidence on the absence of aggregate e®ects of this
kind of heterogeneity. However, the e®ects on individual behavior of this kind of hetero-
geneity are not consistent with the experimental paper of Fisher, Isaac, Schatzberg and
Walker (1995).
When we introduce the model to a setting where the dominant strategy is interior,
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the model is partially consistent with the available evidence of overcontribution. The model
predicts one case where this kind of equilibrium occurs, but in all other cases this equilibirum
dissapears. Moreover, as the scale of the game increases, we should observe a result exactly
in the opposite direction, that is, less contribution than the dominant strategy equilibrium.
The model of Rabin (1993), as a consequence of this analysis, is partially consistent
with experimental data for the type of situations described here. Moreover, testing directly
the model may be not possible since we can not observe directly beliefs and intentions.
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Proof of Proposition 2:
In order to prove this result we have to solve the maximization problem for each
individual. By introducing the equilibrium conditions de¯ned in De¯nition 1 we obtain the
results of the proposition.
Observe that the utility function attributed to each individual is a linear function
in the decision variable. Hence, the conditions are given by the slope of this function. The
conditions for agent i (those for agent j are symmetric) are:
a) If X
¡¡pi+ a2¢+³exjzj ¡ ®´ 1zi > 0 then x¤i = zi: This condition de¯nes the best-
reply of agent i to a given belief on agent j. In particular, from the previous inequality,
exj > £X ¡pi ¡ a2 ¢ zi+ ®¤ zj: Moreover, we know that 0 · exj · zj : From here we obtain the
condition that appears in case i) in the proposition:
X
³
pi ¡ a2
´
zi < 1 ¡® or X (1 ¡MPCRi) pizi < 1 ¡®: (1A)
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b) If X
¡¡pi+ a2¢ + ³exjzj ¡ ®´ < 0, then x¤i = 0: This de¯nes the following condi-
tion, 0 · exj < £X ¡pi ¡ a2¢ zi + ®¤zj : Observe that the right hand side is strictly positive,
hence this inequality is always possible.
c) If X
¡¡pi+ a2¢ + ³ exjzj ¡ ®´ = 0; then xi 2 [0; zi] : Since 0 · exj · zj ,these two
conditions imply 0 · exj = £X ¡pi ¡ a2 ¢ zi+ ®¤ zj · z. From here, X ¡pi ¡ a2 ¢ zi · 1 ¡®:
The conditions for agent j are symmetric to these ones. From here we set the
following condition:
¡
pi ¡ a2
¢
zi ¸ ¡pj ¡ a2¢ zj : This condition allows us to organize the
best-reply correspondances in cases. To get the equilibria it just remains to consider that,
in equilibrium, beliefs must coincide with actions. The previous conditions then describe
the best-reply of agent i to possible actions of agent j.
2.6.2 Proof of Proposition 3:
Recall the equilibrium contributions, in the case where intermediate contributions
exist, are:
x¤i (X; a; pj ; zj ; zi;®) =
h
X
³
pj ¡ a2
´
zj +®
i
zi; i = 1;2: j 6= i: (2A)
Consequently, the partial derivatives with respect to the di®erent arguments are:
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@x¤i (X;a;pj;zj ;zi;®)
@X = (1 ¡ MPCRj)pjzjzi > 0
@x¤i (X;a;pj;zj ;zi;®)
@zi = X (1 ¡ MPCRj)pjzj + ® > 0
@x¤i (X;a;pj;zj ;zi;®)
@zj
= X (1 ¡ MPCRj)pjzi > 0
@x¤i (X;a;pj;zj ;zi;®)
@® = zi > 0
@x¤i (X;a;pj;zj ;zi;®)
@pj = Xzjzi > 0
@x¤i (X;a;pj;zj ;zi;®)
@a = ¡12Xzjzi < 0
2.6.3 Proof of Proposition 4:
In this case both agents are identical, so we solve the maximization problem for
agent i. By using the Kuhn-Tucker theorem we ¯nd the best-responses for each agent given
the expectations on the behavior of the other agent. Notice that the utility function is
concave in its argument. The Kuhn-Tucker program is:
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maxxi X ¢ ¦i(xi; exj) + exj¡(z¡(1¡®)D)z h1 + xi¡(z¡®D)z i
+¸xi +¹ (z ¡xi)
Conditions:
i) X (¡A + 2 (z ¡ xi) + B)+ exj¡(z¡(1¡®)D)z2 + ¸¡ ¹ = 0:
ii) ¸ ¸ 0;¹ ¸ 0:
iii) xi ¸ 0; (z ¡ xi) ¸ 0:
iv) ¸xi = 0; ¹ (z ¡ xi) = 0:
From here we derive the best-responses of agent i to given beliefs on j's behavior
situations:
a) x¤i = 0 if exj < z ¡ (1 ¡®)D ¡ 2Xz2 (z ¡ D) :
Since 0 · exj · z; this is possible when X < z¡(1¡®)D2z2(z¡D)
b) x¤i = z if exj > z ¡ (1 ¡®)D + 2Xz2D:
Since 0 · exj · z; this is possible when X < 1¡®2z2
c)x¤i = (z ¡ D) + exj¡(z¡(1¡®)D)2Xz2
if max
©
0; z ¡ (1 ¡®)D ¡ 2Xz2(z ¡ D)ª · exj and
exj · min©z ¡ (1 ¡ ®)D + 2Xz2D;zª :
Notice that max
©
0; z ¡ (1 ¡®)D ¡ 2Xz2(z ¡ D)ª = z¡(1 ¡®)D¡2Xz2(z¡D)
when X · z¡(1¡®)D2z2(z¡D) :
Moreover, min
©
z ¡ (1 ¡ ®)D + 2Xz2D;zª = z ¡ (1 ¡ ®)D + 2Xz2D when X ·
1¡®
2z2 :
From here, we obtain the best-response correspondances for each agent to the
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belief on the action of the other agent. In equilibrium beliefs must coincide with actions,
hence we obtain the e®ective best-responses organized by cases depending on the scale of
the game, X.
For the intermediate contributions equilibrium, when it exists, calculations show
that the equilibrium contributions are given by:
x¤i = x¤j = z ¡D ¡ ®D2Xz2 ¡ 1 (3A)
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Chapter 3
Reference Points and Negative
Reciprocity in Simple Sequential
Games
3.1 Introduction
Experimental research on motivation in games has made progress. The accumu-
lation of results from experiments with a variety of games has made it clear that, in many
situations, subjects' behavior is not exclusively guided by the drive to obtain the highest
possible individual monetary payo®. However, the precise motivational forces behind ob-
served behavior are not yet clear. The next task before us is a systematic experimental
investigation of these forces. This new research phase will probably evolve in parallel to the
formulation of new data-based theoretical models of motivation. The use of experiments
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allows this interrelated development of data and models.
We believe that people's concern about the distribution of payo®s is a natural
ingredient of any explanation of the facts. What di®erent distributional explanations have
in common is a conception of individuals' behavior in terms of their own payo® and of some
features of the distribution of payo®s among the individuals involved in the situation. To
understand motivation in these terms, one just needs to take into account realized outcomes,
and not be concerned with any elements of the process by which outcomes are reached.
Distributional concerns may, however, only allow for a very partial explanation
of behavior. A crucial question is whether individuals' behavior is also a®ected by their
perceptions of others' intentions. Now, how are intentions judged? For intentions to be a
distinct motivational factor, the basis on which individuals attribute them to others must
be some kind of non-outcome information, i.e. information that does not pertain to the
distribution of payo®s that has resulted from individuals' choices, so that choices are not
based solely on comparisons between the resulting individual outcomes. This non-outcome
information could, a priori, be of many di®erent types. Experimental analysis can be
directed to identifying which of these types of information actually matter.
Concern for intentions is at the basis of what we will refer to as reciprocity: positive
reciprocity involves rewarding perceived good intentions, while negative reciprocity leads
to punishing perceived bad intentions. One important di®erence between various existing
theoretical models of motivation is whether they allow for the in°uence of intentions and
reciprocity. Recent distributional models by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) do not integrate intentions, whereas it is at the heart of Rabin (1993).
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Models of the ¯rst type involve rather direct extensions of the simple individualistic notion of
own-payo® maximization, while models that do incorporate the e®ects of intentions need to
take one more step away from the standard economic view. We believe that presently there
is not yet enough evidence to judge what type of models will be needed to accommodate
the emerging body of data. More speci¯cally, additional experiments are needed to explore
the role of intentions.
This paper presents some new experimental data that are favorable to the relevance
of intentions and reciprocity in simple sequential games. Section 2 places our experiment
in the context of previous work in the area. Section 3 presents the speci¯cs of our design
and the experimental procedures. In section 4 we discuss the results and in section 5 we
present our conclusions.
3.2 Previous experiments on reciprocity and the act of choice
Interest in the issue of whether behavior depends only on outcomes or whether
it is also in°uenced by the choice process is not limited to experimental economists. Sen
(1997) has analyzed this from a more general theoretical perspective. He states that: "A
person¶s preferences over comprehensive outcomes (including the choice process) have to
be distinguished from the conditional preferences over culmination outcomes given the act
of choice"1. He then proceeds to say that the responsibility associated with choice can
in°uence people's rankings over narrowly-de¯ned outcomes, and singles out two of the ways
in which responsibility may matter. His classi¯cation provides a good organizing tool for
1The italics stem from the original.
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previous experiments on intentions and reciprocity, and for the design used in this paper.
The ¯rst manner in which, following Sen, the choice process may matter is through
"chooser dependence": a person's evaluation of an outcome may depend on the identity or
some characteristics of the chooser, i.e. the decision maker that led to that outcome. "Menu
dependence" is the second channel through which the act of choice may a®ect decisions:
preferences over an outcome may depend on what other possible, but unreached, outcomes
of the situation involved were. It is, of course, also conceivable that chooser-dependence
and menu-dependence interact with each other, i.e. the e®ects of varying the menu may be
di®erent for choosers of di®erent types.
All the experiments that have investigated the issue of intentions are based on
rather simple sequential games, involving ¯rst and second movers. The behavior that is
analyzed to detect the in°uence of intentions is the second mover's reaction to the ¯rst
mover's action. The crux of the problem is whether variations in the circumstances under
which the ¯rst mover makes his choice a®ect the second mover's reaction to it.
Blount (1995) and Charness (1997) focus on a certain kind of "chooser" dependence
by comparing reactions to actions taken by humans with reactions to random actions. In
this case, the basis for possible di®erences in reactions to favorable or unfavorable actions is
the attribution of di®erent responsibilities to the two types of chooser. Human players can
be judged to be responsible for making fully conscious decisions, whereas random players
are obviously unconscious.
Blount studies second mover behavior in ultimatum games comparing reactions
to o®ers by self-interested human ¯rst movers with those to o®ers by random ¯rst movers.
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The procedure involves asking second movers for minimum acceptable o®ers. She ¯nds
that, even controlling for ¯rst mover behavior, minimum acceptable o®ers for human ¯rst
movers were higher than in the random condition. This behavior of second movers can be
interpreted as the rejection of some o®ers due only to the fact that they were consciously
made, i.e. as a punishment for consciously making low o®ers.2
Charness analyzes the same kind of chooser dependence in a bilateral gift-exchange.
In this kind of game a ¯rst mover chooses one among many gift levels. The second mover
then decides on the degree to which he returns the gift.3 He ¯nds that the slope representing
second movers' reactions to preceding gifts by humans is steeper than the one corresponding
to random players.4 The higher rate at which human gifts are returned, as compared with
those resulting from the random mechanism, is attributed to the reward of good intentions.
Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998) study menu dependence. They investigate it
in the context of simple sequential two-person dilemma games, comparing players' decisions
in two di®erent types of choice situations.5 In the ¯rst situation, a player individually
2The experiments reported in Blount (1995) did not actually involve self-interested human or random
¯rst movers. All subjects were in the second mover position and they were asked what they would do in
response to an ultimatum game proposal made by either a self-interested human, a human third party, or a
draw from a given random distribution. There were no actual ¯rst-mover choices and subjects were paid a
°at fee for their participation, instead of being paid for their decisions, as they were told they would be.
3A gift-exchange game is strategically similar to a sequential public goods game. However, in the design
used in Charness (1997) the asymmetry between the payo®s of the two players gives the game a di®erent
°avor.
4Kagel, Kim and Moser (1996) analyze chooser dependence of a somewhat di®erent sort. In standard
ultimatum games they compare second movers' reactions to o®ers by two types of human ¯rst movers, with
di®erent information. In their experiments players bargained over chips and the two relevant treatments
consisted in the following variation of the information regarding their chip payo®s: in one of the treatments
both players knew both chip payo®s, while in another one the second player knew both chip payo®s, but the
¯rst player knew only his own payo®. As in Blount and Charness one type of ¯rst mover is fully informed
about the consequences of his actions for both players; the other type of human ¯rst mover does not know
what the economic consequences of his actions are for the other player. These di®erences in the chooser's
circumstances may induce di®erent judgements of intentions in the second mover. The results of Kagel, Kim
and Moser are, however, inconclusive since the treatment e®ect varies with changes in the chip conversion
rate.
5We use the term dilemma games to refer to a wide class of games that includes the standard prisoner's
dilemma, public goods games and common pool resource games, among others. The games actually used
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chooses among di®erent distributions of payo®s between himself and another player in a
dictator-type context in which the player can increase the other player's as well as the total
payo® at a cost to himself. In the second situation, players choose among the same set
of options, given that another player has selected that set of options among two possible
sets. In this context, menu dependence would imply that the presence of the second set of
options a®ects the choice among the ¯rst set of options. The reason why menu dependence
might matter is because the second player may attribute a good or a bad intention to the
¯rst player on the basis of his prior choices. More speci¯cally, if the choice set that the
second player has already discarded is inferior for the second player than the one actually
chosen, he may react more favorably to the ¯rst player's choice than when he just has
to choose among the options of the ¯rst choice set in the dictator-type situation. If that
happened, it would indicate that the attribution of intentions matters and that it leads to
positive reciprocity. The evidence obtained by Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels, however,
is not consistent with menu dependence and, hence, with the notion that intentions a®ect
behavior. Their results show that players' decisions within a choice set are not a®ected by
variations in another choice set.6
The body of previous experimental results can be summarized by saying that
there is some evidence that non-outcome information matters. However, all this evidence
pertains to chooser dependence, rather than menu dependence. In this paper we search
for the in°uence of menu dependence in the context of simple sequential games related to
the ultimatum game. The simplicity of the games we use allows for a very transparent
were 2x6 matrix games with a dilemma structure.
6Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998) actually study both positive and negative reciprocity. Their evi-
dence is inconsistent with the reward of good intentions, while they ¯nd some weak (statistically insigni c¯ant)
indication of subjects punishing bad intentions.
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exploration of the presence and the nature of this menu dependence.
3.3 Experimental design and procedures
Our starting point is the game shown in ¯gure 3.1. This is the game Bolton and
Zwick (1995) call the cardinal ultimatum game and Gale, Binmore and Samuelson (1995)
call the ultimatum mini-game. A consequence of the simpli¯ed structure of this game
is that player 1 is extremely restricted in his strategy space with respect to the classical
ultimatum game: he can only propose two di®erent divisions of the pie. This simpli¯cation
has two important consequences. First, as mentioned by Abbink, Bolton, Sadrieh and Tang
(1996), the structure of the ultimatum mini-game allows for a clear separation of outcomes
of di®erent types. Second, as is explained below, the control over players' perceptions and
expectations is increased.
The standard ultimatum game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (here-
after, SPE). A central feature of the SPE outcome is the strong inequality of the payo®s
of the two players. The outcome (R,l2) with associated payo®s (320,80), shown in ¯gure
3.1, is supposed to capture this inequality in the framework of the ultimatum mini-game.
The reason for not choosing the most extreme split-up of 400 units, (400,0), is basically
procedural: a somewhat less unequal distribution of payo®s makes it possible to pay player
2 subjects some compensation for their time.
In the ultimatum game in its standard form there are (in¯nitely) many alternative
outcomes to the SPE outcome. It is not clear which of these are actually envisioned as
alternatives by player 2 when he receives a speci¯c o®er. However, the equal split is often
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L R
0, 0 320, 80 0, 0 200, 200
Player 2 Player 2
l1 r1 l2  r2
Player 1
Figure 3.1: The Ultimatum mini-game. Key: (payo® to player 1, payo® to player 2).
considered to be the most "focal" alternative to the SPE outcome. The ultimatum mini-
game was precisely constructed to guarantee that players only consider the equal split as
alternative to the unequal SPE outcome. This approach can now be taken one step further.
In the experiments reported on in this paper we modi¯ed the above game by
varying the payo®s corresponding to the (L, l1) outcome, without altering any of the other
payo®s. We will call this outcome the "reference point" of the game. We will look at
behavior in variations of the ultimatum mini-game which only di®er in their reference point.
The purpose of the experimental design we use in this paper is to analyze how
player 2's reaction to player 1 having chosen R is a®ected by modi¯cations in the features
of the reference point. Our ¯rst objective is to detect whether there is any e®ect at all. If
so, then that will be direct evidence of the presence of menu dependence, since the reaction
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to having to choose between l2 and r2 (after R) will have been a®ected by other possible
outcomes of the game. We wish, however, to go one step further and to delineate more
concretely in which direction menu dependence guides behavior in our games.7
The reference points that we consider in this paper were selected according to
two criteria. First, the sum of the payo®s at the reference point will always be 400, as
with the SPE outcome. Second, given the restriction of keeping the pie constant, we begin
at the ultimatum mini-game and look at variations along two rather natural dimensions.
Figure 3.2 shows the ¯ve reference points that we consider and organizes them along the two
dimensions we selected. The ultimatum mini-game can be seen as our starting point. The
¯rst dimension of variation refers to whether the payo® to player 2 at the reference point is
more or less than at the ¯fty-¯fty split. The second variation corresponds to payo®s being
more or less equal at the reference point than at the benchmark outcome, (320,80). As
shown below, this selection of reference points yields a rather complete picture of behavior
in this type of games.
The reference points for game 2 and game 4 represent symmetric deviations from
the ¯fty-¯fty split. Those for games 1 and 5 are also symmetric deviations and result in
payo®s more unequal than the (320,80) outcome.8
What are conceivable patterns of responses by player 2 to player 1¶s choice of R,
across games 1 to 5? One possibility is, of course, that player 2 only cares about his own
payo® and, possibly, the distribution of payo®s at the outcome (320, 80). In this case,
reactions to R will be independent of the reference point. Another possibility, however,
7Camerer and Thaler (1995) refer brie°y to this kind of analysis.
8Note that in Game 1 the SPE outcome does not correspond to the outcome (320,80) but to (350,50).
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Equality of reference
point with respect to
          the benchmark
     (320, 80)
Distribution of
payoffs at the reference
point with respect to equal split
Higher payoff to player 1
Equal Split
Higher payoff to player 2
More equality than
at the benchmark
(320, 80)
Less equality than
at the benchmark
(320, 80)
(300, 100)
GAME 2
(200, 200)
GAME 3
(350, 50)
GAME 1
(100, 300)
GAME 4
(50, 350)
GAME 5
Figure 3.2: The games and their associated reference point payo®s.
is that choices are menu dependent and that reference points matter. For example, it is
possible that player 2 reacts more negatively to player 1 choosing R the higher the payo®
that the reference point assigns to player 2. Reference points may also matter in other
ways, as will be discussed in the results section.
Both games 4 and 5 can be seen as approximations, in this simple setting, to
the best-shot game analyzed by Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989) and Prasnikar and Roth
(1992). In the best-shot game there are two Nash equilibrium outcomes which both yield
very unequal payo®s to the two players involved. The payo® combinations at the two
equilibria are actually mirror images of each other: at one of the equilibria player 1 gets a
relatively large amount and player 2 a rather small amount, while at the other equilibrium
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it is exactly the other way around. However, only the ¯rst of these corresponds to an
SPE. Results from experiments with the best-shot game show strong adherence to the SPE
outcome.
There are two important di®erences between games 4 and 5, on one hand, and the
best-shot game, on the other hand. Games 4 and 5 lack the complexity of the best-shot
game and the payo®s at the two Nash equilibrium outcomes are not exactly mirror images
of each other.9 Results from our games will allow us to shed some additional light on the
determinants of behavior in the best-shot game.
We present results from ten sessions, two for each of the games presented in the
precedent pages. All sessions were run at the Universitat Autµonoma de Barcelona. Students
were recruited using billboards posted in social sciences buildings of the university, giving
the incentive to earn some money. Each session involved the participation of sixteen subjects
(except session 2A, where only 14 subjects appeared on time). Average earnings were 2000
pesetas (about $13) The experiment involved a total of 158 students. Subjects earned a
¯xed amount for participation plus the points earned in each period, which were converted,
from the amounts shown in games 1 to 5, directly into pesetas.
The sessions were conducted by three experimenters. At the beginning of each
session subjects were given written copies of the instructions and one of the experimenters
read them aloud. After the instructions had been read and questions publicly answered,
9The best-shot game involves two players. Player 1 states a quantity q1, after which player 2, informed of
q1, states a quantity q2. An amount of public good equal to the maximum of the two quantities results, and
each player i receives the payo® corresponding to that quantity of public good minus his own quantity, qi,
times a given factor. The payo® consequences of their actions are presented to subjects in terms of schedules
of redemption values and expenditure values for di®erent quantity levels up to 21. We believe that it is
fair to say that the games we use in this paper are in a general sense simpler than the best-shot game just
described.
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subjects were randomly assigned to one of two groups in di®erent rooms. In one group
subjects had the role of player 1 (the proposers) while in the other group they had the role
of player 2 (the deciders). Each subject's role was constant during the whole session, which
involved eight periods against di®erent opponents using a no-contagion matching scheme
(seven periods in session 2A). All this was common information. Once the subjects had
been separated into two groups they were randomly distributed across the rooms by the
experimenters in such a way that they could not see each other's decisions. The session
began with the proposers' choices in the ¯rst period. After all proposers had made their
decisions, the monitors collected their decisions individually and transmitted the decision
of the proposers to the corresponding deciders' information sheet. Then, all deciders made
their decisions, which were communicated to the corresponding proposers. Following this,
players privately computed their payo®s for the periods. Subsequent periods were conducted
in the same way. At the end of a session, each player had played eight (seven in session 2A)
one shot games with di®erent players of the other type. The appendix contains a copy of
the instructions for game 1.
3.4 Results: presentation and interpretation
We will center our analysis on how changes in the reference point in°uence the
behavior of those experimental subjects that we assigned to be deciders.10 A summary of
our treatments and data is presented in Table 3.1.
Due to two features of our design we expected behavior of each player 2 to be
10Other papers, as Bolton and Zwick (1995) and Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin and Sefton (1994), study
proposers' motivations.
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Ref. Point N Prop. (320,80) Prop. reject.
Game 1 (350, 50) 128 0.41 (53) 0.0535 (3)
Game 2 (300, 100) 113 0.42 (48) 0.1217 (7)
Game 3 (200, 200) 128 0.46 (60) 0.17 (13)
Game 4 (100, 300) 128 0.55 (70) 0.13 (35)
Game 5 (50, 350) 128 0.80 (103) 0.1626 (20)
Table 3.1: Main descriptive results.
independent across periods and, hence, to obtain results from a set of one-shot games. The
non-contagion matching scheme we used makes repeated game e®ects impossible, since there
is no direct or indirect way in which a decider could a®ect the decisions of those proposers
with which he will be matched in subsequent periods. Through the simplicity of the games
employed we expected to eliminate the deciders' adaptation over time that often results
from learning in more complex environments.
Figure 3.3 presents data that support the claim that behavior is independent over
time. It shows the numbers of the (320,80) proposals and the number of these proposals'
rejections, for each session and each round. We do not observe any strong tendencies. In
particular, rejection rates do not change in a clear way over time and do not appear to be
related to a particular time-pattern of the (320,80) proposals.
Figure 3.4 presents information about rejection behavior; it shows the number of
rejections of the (320,80) proposal by individual ordered from higher to lower together with
the associated number of (320,80) proposals received; for each game we separately show
the results from the two corresponding sessions.11 The ¯gure reveals that there are some
11For instance, the data for game 2 in ¯gure 3.4 show that in session 2A, the player that rejected the
highest number of (320, 80) proposals (denoted by player 1 in this case) made 7 rejections. Another player,
player 2, rejected 6 proposals, another one 4 etc. The graph also shows that player 1 received 8 (320, 80)
proposals, player 2 also received 8, player 3 received 6, etc.
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di®erences in the distribution of rejections; games 2 and 3 appear to exhibit the largest
discrepancy in decider behavior. Averaging over individual rejection rates for the di®erent
treatments we ¯nd values of .0333, .1444, .2183, .3492 and .1641 for games 1 through 5.
Note that the ordering of these averages is in line with those shown in table 3.1.12
The information shown in ¯gures 3.3 and 3.4 is the basis for our statistical tests.
Several statistical comparisons of the results from the di®erent games support the presence
of menu dependence in our data. The information presented in ¯gure 3.3 justi¯es treating
each individual as a statistically independent observation. Using as data individual rejection
rates for the ¯ve games a Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks rejects the
hypothesis of no di®erence across games at the 5% level (p<.01 after correcting for ties).
This result only tells us that at least one of the groups is di®erent from all the other
ones. To determine which pairs of groups are di®erent we can use the multiple-comparison
test described in Siegel and Castellan (1988). Imposing a signi¯cance level of 5% we can
only reject the null hypothesis of equality for the pair formed by games 1 and 4. The
Mann-Whitney or Wilcoxon rank-sum test yields complementary evidence about di®erences
between games 1 and 4; it rejects the hypothesis of no di®erence across the two games (p<.01
after correcting for ties).
Another way of directly comparing the two treatments is based on the classi¯cation
of each individual observation into one of two groups depending on the number of times
that individual rejected in a session; this information can be gauged from ¯gure 4.13 We use
12Although our focus is on behavior after player 1 choosing R, the readermay also be interested in behavior
after L. Average individual rejection rates after player 1 choosing L were .1927, .0365, 0, .125, .0555 for games
1 through 5.
13For instance, in game 4 there were ¯ve individuals who never rejected (four in session 2A and 1 in session
2B); all the others rejected at least once.
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two di®erent ways of allocating subjects into two groups. The ¯rst one consists in assigning
individuals with zero rejections, those who behave according to the usual assumption in
economics, into one group and individuals with any other number of rejections into the
other. With these data one can now perform tests of di®erences of proportions. Using the
Fischer exact test we can reject a one-tail null hypothesis of equality at p=.001. This test
can be redone based on a di®erent grouping of individuals: one group formed by individuals
with none or one rejection and another group with all the others. A one-tail test allows a
rejection of equality of behavior at p=.008.
We can also use the Â2 test to test for di®erences between games 1 and 4. On the
basis of the two di®erent groupings of individual observations mentioned in the previous
paragraph we reach the same conclusion with p=.01 in both cases.14
All previous studies on chooser and menu dependence, as well as the present one
only elicit and examine subjects' choices and not their thought processes. To directly
connect either type of dependence with the notion that humans react to others' intentions,
one would need independent information about motivation and the attribution of intentions.
One possible way of collecting this information is through asking subjects directly about
their interpretation of other's behavior under di®erent conditions. In the absence of this
kind of information we present an explanation of behavior that is consistent with the overall
picture that emerges from the data of our ¯ve games. We interpret the observed type of
14An alternative way of using Â2 tests is to test for equality of the ¯ve samples. For the ¯rst partition
of individual rejection frequencies mentioned above (individuals with zero rejections in one group all others
in the other group), a test with four degrees of freedom rejects the null hypothesis that the ¯ve sample
frequencies come from the same population (p<0.05). However, the decomposition procedure described in
Siegel and Castellan (1988) which aimed at identifying the source of the discrepancy between k samples
does not make it possible to separate one treatment from all the others. Also, lack of data does not make it
possible to perform the test for di®erences in the ¯ve samples with the second way of partitioning individual
behavior.
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dependence in terms of a psychological mechanism by which people attribute intentions to
others, rewarding good ones and punishing bad ones.
Our explanation uses the overall rejection rates shown in table 3.1. When the
reference point has payo®s (350,50) the rejection rate is rather low; a possible interpretation
of this fact is that the responder can not feel badly treated at the outcome (320,80). If
the reference point is changed to (300,100) the rejection rate goes up. A rationale for this
change is that now the responder would be better o® than at what is now the SPE outcome.
However, as revealed by the Kruskal-Wallis test, the di®erence is not statistically signi¯cant.
A simple explanation for the lack of a statistically signi¯cant e®ect is that the di®erence
between the two reference points is rather small. This is also true when we move to the
ultimatum mini-game. By contrast, the change to reference point payo®s (100,300) leads
to a substantial increase in the rejection rate, which now is signi¯cantly di®erent than for
reference point payo®s (350, 50).
Up to this point the rejection rate has varied directly with increases in the abso-
lute and relative payo® of the responder at the reference point. However, when moving to
reference point payo®s (50,350) the rejection rate goes down again. This last fact is con-
sistent with the interpretation that the responder does not only consider his absolute and
relative payo® at the reference point, but also takes into account the proposer¶s situation:
responders do not punish the proposer heavily for not making an o®er that gives a larger
share to the responder and is more unequal than the SPE payo® combination.15
15The interpretation we present may go against some readers' intuitions. For instance, the lack of di®erence
in rejection rates between Games 1 and 3 may come as a surprise. It can be argued that in Game 1 the
proposer is particularly unfair if he chooses the (320,80) outcome, because both options give the proposer
already an advantage and he could be "fair" at a low cost to himself by proposing the (300,100) distribution.
This very natural conjecture is, however, not con¯rmed by our data.
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It is not hard to show that, in our data, the e®ects caused by changes in the
reference point also have some quantitative importance. The ratio between the statistically
di®erent rejection rates for games 1 and 4 is about 6 to 1. Given that the rejection rate at a
reference point with payo®s (400,0) can reasonably be assumed to be no greater than the one
for (350,50), the factor 6 can actually be considered to be a lower bound on the maximum
variation of rejection rates that can be caused, in the kind of games with study, by changes
in reference points. Our interpretation is that this six-fold multiplication of rejection rates
is a negative reaction to having been made an o®er of (320,80) when a certain other o®er
was available; it can, therefore, be seen as a punishment of bad intentions, what previously
we have referred to as negative reciprocity.
Our results also shed some indirect light on the debate about behavior in the best-
shot game. Prasnikar and Roth (1992) interpret the fact that, in contrast to the ultimatum
game, behavior in the best-shot game is very close to the SPE prediction as evidence that
subjects are guided by strategic considerations. GÄuth and Tietz (1990), however, argue that
the best-shot game has the feature that "fairness considerations" do not interfere with the
acceptance of the SPE outcome. In our terminology, the best-shot game has a reference
point which induces few rejections of the SPE outcome. Therefore, behavior in the best-shot
game cannot be taken as evidence that "fairness considerations" do not matter in this type
of games.
Our data is consistent with the idea of GÄuth and Tietz that, in a sequential game
with various equilibria, the characteristics of the reference point a®ect the acceptance of
the SPE outcome. This is shown by comparing results from a series of games which di®er
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in their reference point, but which are all the same from the cognitive point of view. In our
opinion, this is a much more direct line of exploring this issue than by working with games
of very di®erent character, like the Bertrand competition game studied by Prasnikar and
Roth.16
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper we present the ¯rst experimental evidence of the presence of menu
dependence. In the context of sequential mini-games, the proportion of rejections of a
speci¯c o®er depends on the payo® distribution at an alternative outcome of the game,
which we call the reference point. We also provide some indications of how reference points
matter. In three of our ¯ve treatments we observe that the proportion of rejections to a
given o®er increases with the absolute payo® (and relative payo®, given the character of
the payo®s in our games) to the decider. In the remaining treatment we ¯nd evidence
that responders do more than just compare their payo® at the reference point to their
payo® at the benchmark outcome. Responders seem to feel that they can not expect the
proposer to choose an outcome which more than reverses the distribution of payo®s of the
unequal benchmark outcome. As in other experimental work in the area, we ¯nd evidence
of punishing behavior. However, the features of our experimental design allow us to obtain
a more complete picture of the motivational factors that prompt this kind of behavior; the
degree of punishment may be a®ected by reference points.
16We do no have data from a game with a reference point with payo®s (80, 320). Therefore, our data can
not directly support or reject the idea that rejections in the best-shot game are lower than in a game with
a very egalitarian reference point. Actually, Games 2 and 4 which are close to the best shot game exhibit
very di®erent behavior.
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Taken together, the accumulated experimental evidence can be considered to be
quite favorable to the relevance of intentions and reciprocity in a number of simple games.
The problem is, however, still very open. We see at least two lines for further research.
First, a more complete analysis of the e®ects of reference points is needed. For instance, it
remains to be seen what behavior will be like if reference points are more or less e±cient
than the benchmark outcome. Second, it would be interesting to analyze how important
the phenomenon of reciprocity is in richer environments, which are closer to natural eco-
nomic situations. It would be particularly relevant to investigate whether the attribution
of intentions can have any in°uence in market contexts.
Thus, there is now evidence that both menu and chooser dependence can be sources
of reciprocity. Our impression is that menu dependence is a rather pervasive force. That
is, counterfactuals may matter in many economic situations. This is, of course, just a
conjecture which will need to be con¯rmed in future research.
3.6 Appendix: Written Instructions for Game 1
INTRODUCTION:
You will be taking part in a experimental study on decision making. The in-
structions are simple and if you read them carefully, you may earn a signi¯cant amount of
money. We will now give you a show-up fee of 500 pesetas. All the money you obtain in
the experiment is for you and this money will be paid to you at the end of the experiment.
We will start by reading the instructions and, following this, you will have the
opportunity to ask questions about the procedures described in theses instructions.
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TYPES OF PLAYERS:
In this experiment there will be two types of players: player 1 and player 2. At
the end of the reading of these instructions, each participant will take one of the cards you
can see in this box. Each card has a letter written on it. All the participants who draw a
letter A will remain in this room. All the participants who draw a B will go to a adjacent
room where they will be assigned to di®erent seats. Each participant will be of the same
type during the whole experiment.
ROUNDS:
The experiment will consist of 8 rounds. In each round there will be 8 pairs of
participants, each of these pairs containing a player 1 and a player 2. For each round, each
player 1 will be paired with a di®erent player 2 and vice versa. In this way no participant
will be paired with the same partner twice.
DECISIONS:
In each round and for each pair, player 1 will make a decision and player 2 will
make a decision. First, player 1 will choose between two alternative options: Left or Right.
Next, player 2 will be informed of the decision of player 1 in his/her pair. Then, player 2 will
choose between two alternative options: Left or Right. Finally, player 1 will be informed
of the decision of the player 2 in his/her pair, and players will know their payments for the
round. Following rounds will develop in the same way until round 8.
For each combination of decisions in a pair there is a payment to player 1 and a
payment to player 2 as you can observe in the following table:
The decisions can be described by the following ¯gure where, in the bottom part,
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Player 1 chooses Player 2 chooses Player 1 gets Player 2 gets
Left Left 350 50
Left Right 0 0
Right Left 320 80
Right Right 0 0
Table 3.2: Decisions/Payo®s for the instructions to Game 1
you can observe the corresponding payments to player 1 and player 2 (payment to player 1
above and payment to player 2 below):
    Player 1
      Player 2 Player 2
           Left Right
    Left Right        Left Right
 350
   50
     0
     0
320
  80
    0
    0
Game representation for the instructions (Game 1)
RECORD OF RESULTS:
Now observe your sample record sheet, given to you together with the instructions.
Once the types of players will have been drawn and the experiment will be about to start,
we will give you the record sheet on which you will actually record your decisions.
Your identi¯cation number will appear at the top of the sheet. Below your assigned
type of player, 1 or 2, will appear. Recall that all type 1 players will remain in this room
and all type 2 players will be in an adjacent room.
Below you will see a table of payments.
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At the bottom of the page, the ¯rst column shows the round number. The second
column will show the identi¯cation number of the participant that will be paired with you
in each round. Observe that in each round, you will be paired with a di®erent partner. In
the next two columns decisions will be registered. Once you will have been informed of the
decision of your partner in a round, you will register your payment in pesetas in the last
column.
PAYMENT:
At the end of the eight rounds you will compute the sum corresponding to your
earnings for the 8 rounds of the experiment. You will add to it the 500 pesetas that you
have already received for your participation and you will ¯ll out the receipt that we have
given you. Following this, you will wait silently until one of the organizers will pay you
privately.
QUESTIONS:
The experiment is going to start. Do you have any question about the procedures
described in the instructions?
FINAL OBSERVATION:
In the experiment you are not allowed to talk or communicate with other partici-
pants. Please, do not ask public questions during the experiment. If you have any question
once the experiment has started, raise your hand and one of the organizers will come to
answer it to you.
Now, please take one of the cards and follow the instructions of the organizers of
this experiment.
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0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Round
R
ej
ec
tio
ns
 /
 P
ro
po
sa
ls
Rejections 1A
Rejections 1B
Proposals 1A
Proposals 1B
Game 3: Decisions by Round
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Game 2: Decisions by round
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Game 4: Decisions by round
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Game 5: Decisions by round
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Figure 3.3: Decisions by round.
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Game 1: Individual decisions
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Figure 3.4: Individual decisions
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Chapter 4
Distributional Concerns and
Reference Points
4.1 Introduction
Research on decision making in economic problems is increasing both from a theo-
retical point of view and from an experimental point of view. The dialogue between theory
and experiments is generating a better understanding of decision processes in several con-
texts. This paper contributes to this dialogue from the experimental point of view, but
the theoretical foundations will be discussed. We study simple extensive-form, two-person
games in which negative reciprocity plays a key role. The term reciprocity will refer to
the willingness to reward perceived good intentions and to punish perceived bad intentions,
based on observed actions. Hence, a player's choice of an action that reduces the payo® of
the other player (with respect to payo®s associated to other available actions) in response
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to a situation considered as unfair will be considered as motivated by negative reciprocity.
In this paper we consider situations in which negative reciprocity results in lower payo®s for
the punishing player also. We analyze whether the degree of negative reciprocity in players'
actions is a®ected by payo® changes at a reference point. A reference point is an outcome
of the game that may give information to a player on the fairness or desirability of other
outcomes.
In the games proposed here we study how manipulations in a Nash Equilibrium
outcome of an Ultimatum Mini-game, the reference point, a®ect negative reciprocity at
the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium outcome, hence the frequency with which the theoretical
predictions are observed. This in°uence may also be considered as menu dependence [Sen
(1997)]. The manipulations involve varying the relative payo® or the absolute payo® of the
second player and the joint payo® at the reference point across games.
This analysis is placed in the context of ultimatum games. Brandts and Solµa
(2000) analyzed simple sequential two-person games that simplify the structure of the ul-
timatum game to increase control over players' perceptions of reciprocity considerations.
They show that di®erent reference points lead to signi¯cantly di®erent rejection rates of the
SPE proposal. That is, a certain factor in°uencing punishment and a partial explanation of
its e®ect was found. Here we carry out a systematic analysis of the way in which reference
points may matter. The experimental data presented here are not designed to test subgame
perfection but to make a constructive analysis of factors that concern decision processes.
In particular, this chapter studies the interaction between reference points and absolute
payo®s, relative payo®s and e±ciency considerations. These concepts allow us to study how
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agents interpret the intentionality of another agents' action in terms of the reference point,
represented here as a lost opportunity. The experiment presented here analyzes whether re-
ference points outcomes are used as instruments that help deciders to choose an action. The
interaction analyzed contributes to understand failures of the SPE prediction and provides
data that may help the developing of behavioral theories.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the concept of choice
dependence and discusses the related literature. Section 4.3 introduces the hypotheses and
designs used. Section 4.4 presents and discusses results and section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Distributional concerns and intentionality
The ultimatum game has generated a fruitful discussion of theories of behavior
because of its robust experimental results which di®er from the theoretical results.1 Di®erent
theories have proposed explanations for the evidence presented.
Distributional theories such as those of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) have been proposed to explain results for a variety of games within a uni¯ed
theory. While distributional motivations explain some results, new experimental evidence
seems to con¯rm that additional factors play a role in observed behavior, in particular the
role of intentionality detection. This is clearly observed in the behavior of the second mover
in ultimatum games where the choice process has been analyzed in detail. We proceed
to present recent studies to describe the problem and to place this paper in the research
associated to it.
1See Kagel and Roth (1995) for a complete overview of experimental results.
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Sen (1997) analyzes the importance of the choice process in decision making focus-
ing on two aspects: chooser dependence and menu dependence. These concepts refer to the
idea that, in order to understand certain choices by individuals, it is necessary to consider
that the structure of the sequential decision problem may a®ect choices independently of
monetary payo®s.
Chooser dependence refers to the fact that a speci¯c opponent is involved in the
process. The importance of chooser dependence has been established for ultimatum games
and gift exchange games by Kagel, Kim and Moser (1996), Blount (1995), and Charness
(1997). These studies show, in di®erent contexts, that agents react di®erently to the same
action depending on the type of agent that they face. Kagel, Kim and Moser (1996) deal
with agents, the proposers of ultimatum games, who have di®erent information about the
consequences of their actions. These informational di®erences are taken into account by
the responders and reactions to identical o®ers di®er according to such di®erences, showing
that responders consider the intentionality of an action (given by the knowledge of its
consequences) as relevant information. Blount (1995) analyzes reactions of responders to
proposals in ultimatum games when the proposers are an interested partner, a computer or
an uninterested partner. This line of research focuses on the attribution of intentionality
to player 1 when he plays his SPE strategy. This attribution is possible if player 1 knows
the consequences that his/her action has on player 2 or is an interested partner. Charness
(1997) found that in gift exchange games simulating labor markets, workers react di®erently
to the same contracts generated by di®erent types of contractors.
Menu dependence refers to the fact that preferences over outcomes are dependent
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on the menu or the choice set in which this alternative is placed. This line of research,
which is directly connected to models of reciprocity and fairness, has not been intensively
analyzed using experimental methods. In sequential two-person games, Beard and Beil
(1994) present a study where menu dependence is not observed for the second mover but
the possibility of it a®ects ¯rst mover behavior. The relevance of menu dependence has been
analyzed in di®erent sequential two-person games by Brandts and Solµa (2000), showing that
the menu with which a choice is presented, even if the outcomes involved in the choice are
not changed, a®ects the reaction to these outcomes. They present a situation that entails
a negotiation between two players similar to an ultimatum game. The SPE equilibrium
of the game implies a highly unequal distribution of resources, but the ¯rst mover had
the opportunity to present a di®erent o®er, which is a Nash Equilibrium outcome. Their
results show that variations in the Nash Equilibrium outcome (a reference point) a®ect the
frequency with which the second mover plays his/her SPE strategy. Not playing their SPE
strategy is a negative reciprocal action in response to an o®er considered unfair.
This research is closely related to models that incorporate fairness in subjects'
behavior. Fairness was introduced in a seminal paper by Rabin (1993) following the analysis
of psychological games provided by Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stachetti (1989). Rabin (1993)
uses the framework of psychological games and presents a model in which agents value the
monetary payo® as well as a psychological payo®. The psychological payo® incorporates
the fairness component, since agents may be willing to react kindly to those who act kindly
to them or unkindly to those acting unkindly to them, even in situations where this implies
to give up monetary payo®s. Intentions play an important role in this model since fairness
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is based on the beliefs about the reasons of others' expected actions. These reasons are
measured in terms of the possible actions available to the other players. WhileRabin's model
is presented for simultaneous games, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) develop a similar
model for sequential games and more than two players. They use the concept of sequential
reciprocity. Kindness or spitefulness towards each player is the result of actions of others
that a®ect one's own payo®. The direction of the present paper is close to Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (1998) by using a design to test how negative reciprocity in sequential games
is a®ected by introducing speci¯c payo® variations in the reference point. These variations
try to connect distributional theories with the role of reference points.
4.3 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
In order to clarify our main research hypotheses consider the following extensive
form game in Figure 4.1.
Notice that the outcome (320,80) is the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium out-
come of the game. The outcome (200,200) corresponds to the other Nash equilibrium
outcome of the game. The focus of this paper is on whether certain variations of the payo®s
in the Nash Equilibrium may play a role as a reference point in that they may a®ect the
frequency with which player 2 plays his part of the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium strategy
pro¯le [even if it is o® the equilibrium path]. We will use Game 1 as our baseline to analyze
the in°uence that a reference point may have on observed behavior.
Observe that if player 2 is not playing his part of the SPE when this subgame is
reached, player 2 renounces to a positive payo® to punish player 1. This behavior will be in-
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Figure 4.1: Game 1. The Ultimatum mini-game.
terpreted as negative reciprocity. Negative reciprocity may be in°uenced by several factors.
Bolton (1991) and Bolton et al (1996) suggest the magnitude of player 2s relative payo®,
meaning the ratio between his payo® and the payo® of the other player at the SPE, as the
main factor. Lower player 2's relative payo®s would result in higher negative reciprocity.
The model of fairness by Rabin (1993) and the model of sequential reciprocity by Dufwen-
berg and Kirchsteiger (1998) suggest other in°uences. Depending on the opportunities that
were available to player 1 (the reference point), di®erent intentions can be attributed to a
given action. A "bad intention" may trigger negative reciprocity.
Brandts and Sola (2000) present experimental evidence that, varying the payo®s
of the reference point will a®ect the frequency with which player 2 plays his SPE strategy.
Their experimental results show that increasing player 2's payo® at the reference point
(while reducing simultaneously the payo® to player 1, to keep the sum of payo®s -joint
payo®- at the reference point constant) increases signi¯cantly the frequency of negative
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reciprocity. That is, player 2 plays with lower frequency his part of the SPE. This result
holds for four out of ¯ve treatments.2 When the payo® to player 2 at the reference point
was the highest, the frequency of play by this player of the SPE increased again. For this
case it also happened that the payo® to player 2 at the reference point was even larger than
the payo® of player 1 at the SPE (and therefore, the payo® of player 1 at the reference point
was smaller than the payo® of player 2 at the SPE). This means that the two outcomes
with positive payo®s in this game were highly unequal and the SPE favored player 1 while
the reference point favored player 2. Thus, player 2 considered possibly that the SPE o®er
was no longer such an unfair action, given the other option available to player 1.
These results con¯rm the importance that the reference point may have in some
situations. In order to explain these failures of the SPE equilibrium prediction and the pos-
sible motivation that guides the individuals' actions in these situations, this paper addresses
how the payo® characteristics of the reference point may a®ect negative reciprocity by fo-
cusing on three aspects: relative payo®, absolute payo® and joint payo® considerations. By
relative payo® we mean the ratio between player 2's payo® and player 1's payo® at the refe-
rence point. Absolute payo® means player 2's payo® at the reference point and joint payo®
will be the sum of both players' payo®s at the reference point. Observe that introducing
any change in player 2's relative payo® at the reference point in Game 1 without changing
her (absolute) payo® (and vice versa), means that player 1's payo® will also be changed.
This will imply that the sum of payo®s at the reference point will be di®erent to the sum
of payo®s at the SPE. These simultaneous e®ects will be separated in one case directly but
2The manipulations at the reference point in Brandts and Sola (1998) generated ¯ve treatments. Payo®s
at the reference point for the di®erent games were (350,50), (300,100), (200, 200), (100,300) and (50,350).
The ultimatum mini-game was initially not in that investigation, but was the key to this one.
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we well need an auxiliary game in the other case to disentangle (absolute) payo® and joint
payo® considerations.
To illustrate how relative payo®s may be manipulated to analyze its importance
at the reference point, consider Game 2 in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Game 2. Variation in relative payo® at the reference point.
Observe that Game 2 has the same SPE prediction as Game 1. Also, the payo®
to player 2 at the reference point -that in this case is (250,200)- is the same as in Game 1.
Note that the payo® of player 1 at the reference point is the only di®erence with respect to
Game 1. This change allows isolating what may be the two causes of possible di®erences
between Game 1 and Game 2 in the frequencies with which player 2 plays his/her SPE.
First, the relative payo® of player 2 at the reference point in Game 2 is worse than
in Game 1 (the relative payo® at the ref. point is 1 in Game 1 and 200/250 in Game 2).
If player 2 considers what could have obtained at the reference point in terms of relative
payo®s, he is better o® at the SPE in Game 2 than at the SPE in Game 1. Therefore, we
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might expect higher negative reciprocity in Game 1, where player 2 could have obtained
a higher relative payo® at the reference point. This conjecture based on relative payo®
considerations will be stated as Hypothesis 1 below.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): If player 2's negative reciprocity is increased by relative payo®
increases at the reference point, we should observe a higher frequency of SPE play by player
2 in Game 2 than in Game 1.
The second source of possible di®erences between Game 1 and Game 2 is the joint
payo® (sum of players' payo®s) at the reference point, higher in Game 2 than in Game 1
(and higher than the joint payo® attainable at the SPE). Suppose that player 2 is concerned
about joint payo® considerations at the reference point when he/she has to decide at the
SPE node of the game. If this is true, the outcome at the SPE in Game 2 is worse for player
2 than the outcome at the SPE in Game 1. The reason being that a higher joint payo®
could be reached at the reference point in Game 2. If negative reciprocity is positively
a®ected by joint payo® considerations at the reference point, this should be re°ected in a
lower frequency for player 2's of SPE play in Game 2 (or higher negative reciprocity). This
argument is stated as Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): If negative reciprocity is increased by joint payo® increases at
the reference point with respect to the SPE outcome, we should observe a higher frequency
of SPE play by player 2 in Game 1 than in Game 2.
To discuss our next hypotheses we need to introduce Games 3 and 4, in Figures
4.3(a) and 4.3(b) respectively.
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Figure 4.3: Game 3: Absolute payo® manipulation and Game 4: Ultimatum mini-game
re-scale.
We now consider Games 1 and 3. Both games have the same SPE outcome as
well as the same relative payo® to player 2 at the reference point (200/200 in Game 1
and 225/225 in Game 3). The di®erence between Game 1 and Game 3 is on the players'
(absolute) payo®s at the reference point. This di®erence has two implications on player 2:
his/her absolute payo® at the reference point and the joint payo® at the reference point
are higher in Game 3. Observe that if higher absolute payo® to player 2 or higher joint
payo® at the reference point both increase negative reciprocity at the SPE node, then higher
punishment should be observed in Game 3 with respect to Game 1. The impossibility to
separate both causes by comparing Game 1 and Game 3 is the reason to introduce Game
4.
Game 4, in Figure 4.3(b), is a version of Game 1 at a slightly higher scale . With
respect to Game 3, Game 4 maintains constant the payo®s at the reference point. Moreover
the relative payo® to player 2 at the SPE outcome is the same in Game 3 and Game 4. The
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di®erence between both games is the increase in absolute payo®s to player 1 and player 2
at the SPE outcome in Game 4, changing from (320,80) in Game 3 to (360,90) in Game 4.
The reason of introducing Game 4 is that by doing this manipulation, Game 4 has constant
joint payo® across the two nodes of the game and the same outcome at the reference point
as Game 3. This characteristic allows us to separate the in°uence of absolute payo® at the
reference point and joint payo® di®erences between the reference point and the SPE. Now
absolute payo® considerations have been removed in Game 4 with respect to Game 3. We
proceed to make explicit what hypotheses can be studied through the experimental analysis
of these games.
The (absolute) payo® that player 2 receives at the reference point is higher in
Game 3 than in Game 1 but is equal in Game 3 and Game 4. If player 2 considers the
absolute payo® that he could have obtained at the reference point, he is worse at the SPE
in Game 3 than at the SPE in Game 1 and he is (almost) in the same situation between
Game 3 and Game 4. Therefore, we should expect higher negative reciprocity in Game
3 with respect to Game 1 and no di®erence in negative reciprocity between Game 3 and
Game 4.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): If negative reciprocity is increased by absolute payo® increases
at the reference point, we should observe a higher frequency of SPE play by player 2 in
Game 1 than in Game 3 and no di®erence in frequencies between Game 3 and Game 4.
On the other hand, joint payo® considerations may play a role in Game 3, when
compared to Game 1 and Game 4, because the joint payo® attainable at the reference point
is higher than the joint payo® attainable at the SPE in Game 3. Therefore, if joint payo
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increases at the reference point with respect to the SPE increase negative reciprocity of
player 2, then this factor should play a role when we compare Game 1 and Game 3 and
when comparing Game 3 and Game 4.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): If negative reciprocity is increased by joint payo® increases at
the reference point with respect to the SPE, we should observe a higher frequency of SPE by
player 2 in Game 1 than in Game 3 and also a higher frequency in Game 4 than in Game
3.
4.4 Experimental procedures
Our experiments involved eight sessions run in March 1998 at the Universitat
Autµonoma de Barcelona. Two sessions were run for each of the four games we presented.
Students of the Universitat Autµonoma de Barcelona were recruited using billboards posted
around the social sciences schools. In total, 128 students of social sciences (non-economics
majors) participated in the experiment. Each session involved sixteen participants.
Each session started by distributing the instructions to the participants and pay-
ing a ¯xed amount for participation of 500 PTAs ($3.50). The experimenter proceeded to
read the instructions aloud and to answer questions publicly. After that, participants were
assigned randomly to be either player 1 or player 2. Type 1 players and type 2 players
were allocated in di®erent rooms to increase privacy and anonymity in decisions. When
this process was completed, participants played eight bargaining rounds of the same game
(either Game 1, Game 2, Game 3 or Game 4) against di®erent, anonymous, opponents,
as in a no-contagion scheme. After each round players only knew his/her own payo® and
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Ref. Point Payo®s SPE payo®s Obs. SPE play Ind. rej. (mean)
Game 1 (200, 200) (320, 80) 128 0.46 0.21
Game 2 (250, 200) (320, 80) 128 0.14 0.4
Game 3 (225, 225) (320, 80) 128 0.23 0.359
Game 4 (225, 225) (360, 90) 128 0.2 0.354
Table 4.1: Main descriptive results.
the opponent's payo®. Using this procedure, no player has information about what his/her
opponent in the present round did in previous rounds. All these facts were common in-
formation to all players from the beginning. This procedure is used to obtain a series of
independent one-shot games for each treatment and each session. When the series of rounds
¯nished, payments were distributed privately and the session ¯nished. Each session lasted
about 45 minutes. Average earnings were about 2500 PTAs ($17).
4.5 Results
Since the design is explicitly made to study the implications of manipulating refe-
rence points on punishment levels, we focus on the rates at which players 2s play their part
of the SPE strategy pro¯le across treatments.
We pool the data for all sessions of a given treatment. The aggregate results
obtained in this experiment can be summarized in Table 4.1, which presents the four treat-
ments, the sessions involved in them and the proportion of the games that ended at the
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. The last column shows the mean of the individual rejection
rates for each game.
Before turning into the analysis of rejection rates, notice the observed frequencies
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of SPE play. These frequencies show that ¯rst movers do not rely on the payo® maximization
of the second mover, or act fairly. This result is consistent with other papers and is analyzed
in detail for another kind of two-person sequential games in Beard and Beil (1994). Results
in Brandts and Sola (1998) also present important deviations from SPE.
Game 1: Individual rejection rates
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Game 2: Individual rejection rates
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Player
R
je
ct
io
n 
ra
te
Game 3: Individual rejection rates
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Game 4: Individual rejection rates
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Figure 4.4: Individual rejection rates for each game, ordered from lower rejection rate to
higher.
It proceeds now to comment on the results that come from the comparison across
treatments. We will use individual rejection rates instead of aggregate rejections to ensure
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that we use independent observations. Inspection of the mean rejection rates in Table 1
would indicate that our data point to the direction of rejecting the research hypothesis
of relative payo® considerations, since a higher relative payo® in Game 1, with respect to
Game 2 does not generate higher rejections but, on the contrary, it leads to higher individual
rejection rates. Observation of Figure 4.4, however shows that both games present similar
behavior at the individual level. The direction of the possible change in the rejection
rates between these two games was stated in research hypotheses H1 and H2. Hypothesis
H1 presents what would be the e®ect in negative reciprocity (conversely, the frequency
with which player 2 plays his/her SPE strategy) of changes in player 2 relative payo® at
the reference point in negative reciprocity. Research hypothesis H2 predicts the e®ect on
negative reciprocity across Game 1 and 2 of increasing the joint payo® at the reference
point.
The null hypothesis, H0 is that if the manipulation introduced in the reference
points do not in°uence negative reciprocity, then we should observe no di®erence in rejection
rates between Game 1 and Game 2. We do obtain that the di®erence between these two
games is not signi¯cant at any con¯dence level using a Mann-Whitney test. Further, using
a Fisher exact probability test in which we classify subjects in two categories: those that
reject at least once and those that never reject the SPE o®er, we ¯nd again no signi¯cant
di®erence between the individual rejection rates for these two games. If we pool individuals
according to the criterium of rejecting less than 50% of the times or 50% or more, a Fisher
exact test reveals a weak e®ect (p=0.1055) in support of the research hypothesis H2 (joint
payo® hypothesis). Hence the casual impression obtained from the descriptive results is
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not generally supported. We can not say that relative payo® considerations, neither joint
payo® considerations separately a®ect signi¯cantly the distribution of individual rejection
rates between these two games.
Note that, comparing Game 1 versus Game 3, we do observe a higher mean re-
jection rate in Game 3 and, further, Game 3 and Game 4 present similar mean rejection
rates. This particular direction of the summary data was stated as research hypothesis H3.
Research hypothesis H3 and H4 predict the e®ect on negative reciprocity of manipulations
at the reference point across Games 1, 3 and 4 according to the possible in°uence of absolute
payo® and joint considerations at this point. As we said, summary data point to research
hypothesis H3 that predicted, according to the possible in°uence of absolute payo® consid-
erations, a higher rejection rate in Game 3 with respect to Game 1 because the absolute loss
that the second player faces in the SPE o®er with respect to the reference point is higher
in Game 3. Moreover hypothesis H3 states that we should observe no di®erence between
Game 3 and Game 4 if just absolute payo® considerations matter. Figure 4.4 again shows
that these three games present an almost identical pattern of individual behavior. Again
the Mann-Whitney test reveals no statistical di®erence between Game 1, Game 3 and Game
4. The Fisher exact probability test using the classi¯cation of players that separates those
that do not reject never and the rest neither shows signi¯cant di®erences. Finally, grouping
individuals by their frequency of rejections below 50% or above 50% we don't ¯nd signi¯cant
di®erences between these games at any conventional signi¯cance level.
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4.6 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze extensive two-person games and the presence of negative
reciprocity. Negative reciprocity is considered as the player's choice of an action that reduces
the payo® of the other player. This action may be taken in response to a situation considered
as unfair. For the cases studied in this paper negative reciprocity implies a punishment that
reduces both players' payo®s.
Negative reciprocity is a®ected by certain manipulations of a reference point,as
shown in Brandts and Solµa (2000). A reference point is an outcome of the game that gives
information to a player on the fairness or desirability of other outcomes. In the games
proposed here we study how manipulations in a Nash Equilibrium of a game, the reference
point, a®ect negative reciprocity at the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. This in°uence may
also be considered as menu dependence. The manipulations involve varying the relative
payo® or the absolute payo® of the second player at the reference point across games and
the joint payo® at the reference point.
Relative payo® considerations at the reference point does not appear to be a sepa-
rately important force driving signi¯cant di®erences in the rates with which second movers
play their part of the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium strategy. Moreover, evidence on joint
payo® considerations and absolute payo® considerations is not signi¯cant. This ambiguous
evidence concerning the manipulations introduced makes us think that no de¯nitive conclu-
sions can be reached at this point about it. To explain the results obtained, we can probably
attribute them to the conservative magnitude of the payo® manipulations involved in the
experiment. It would be interesting to manipulate these payo® with larger variations to
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detect the possible in°uence of the absolute payo® for the second player at the reference
point. This conservative approach may be what distinguishes the results presented here
and the results found in Chapter 2.
The lack of signi¯cant di®erences between treatments observed in this experiment
may be attributed to di®erent causes. One potential source could be the relatively small
payo® changes introduced across treatments. Comparing the results of this experiment with
the results obtained in Chapter 2, we can observe clear di®erences in the payo® variations
at the reference point. In Chapter 2 the relative payo® to player two for the ¯ve games
was 0.14, 0.33, 1, 3 and 7, respectively. This means that the relative payo® was at least
doubled from game to game. Not all these games presented signi¯cant di®erences among
them. In particular there was a signi¯cant di®erence between those games with relative
payo®s of 0.14 and 3. In this chapter we base the relative payo® hypothesis in observing
di®erences in a payo® variation that goes from 0.8 (Game 2) to 1 (Game 1) in the relative
payo® to player 2. Clearly, this implies demanding much more than what it was observed in
Chapter 2. Additionally, consider that the changes in reference point outcomes of Chapter
2 entailed both increases in the relative payo® and the absolute payo®, while in this Chapter
we separate both concepts.
The absolute payo® hypothesis was based in the possibility of observing di®erences
between two treatments that implied moving from 200 to 225, a 12.5% of increase in the
absolute payo® to player two at the reference point. In Chapter 2, in contrast, signi¯cant
di®erences were found between treatments that entail an increase in the absolute payo® from
50 to 300, a 600%. Notice that the joint payo® hypothesis was also based in a conservative
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conjecture. The increase in the joint payo® between those games that established the
comparison, Game 1 and Game 3 or Game 1 and Game 2 was from 400 to 450, a 12.5%.
We do not have a basis for comparing this payo® change with the experiment in Chapter 2
but the scale of the change in other variables was higher, as described above.
Another possible origin of the lack of signi¯cant di®erences in this chapter may
be the compensating e®ects that may arise when analyzing the relative payo® hypothesis.
Since we simultaneously change the relative payo® and the joint payo® in opposite direction
between Game 1 and Game 2 we may induce two counteracting forces that compensate each
other. That is we may have obtained that relative payo® is a signi¯cant source of variation
between Game 1 and Game 2 but also that the joint payo® is a signi¯cant force driving
behavior. Then both forces could compensate each other.
Another conclusion which can be drawn from thepresent experiment is the extreme
variation observed in individual behavior. In three out of the four games analyzed, about
half of the players never reject the SPE and the other players reject the SPE 50% of the
times or more. From our point of view, this evidence suggest that models of economic
behavior should consider explicitly the di®erent types of individuals and their motivations,
in line with some recent models like Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt
(1999).
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Chapter 5
The Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma
Game: Reciprocity and Group Size
E®ects
5.1 Introduction
Sequential prisoners' dilemma games may be interpreted as formalizations of many
everyday situations which involve a trade-o® between the private and the collective interest.
Sequentiality in the interaction between people is a feature that seems more appropriate as
a representation of the type of situations I want to study in this paper than the perhaps
more standard case of simultaneous decisions. Examples of these situations are donations
to some fund-raising campaigns when donors can observe what other people previously
donated, e®orts to provide some collective goods in the society with volunteers by listing
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participants, or teamwork production in a ¯rm where workers observe their co-workers'
e®orts.
The prisoner's dilemma game is a simple, structured tool to approach these prob-
lems and additionally allows us to study some fundamental behavioral questions. Similar
approaches include the gift exchange game, the investment game and public good games.
We think that our approach allows us to increase both the control over the players' percep-
tions and the comprehension of the situation of interest. We will discuss further the other
approaches and their main results.
The possible explanations of behavior observed for these kind of situations, with
deviations from self interest, come from di®erent models of interdependent preferences.
These models incorporate in the utility function distributional components. In this paper,
we want to make a close inspection of relevant models for these situations and study a
speci¯c conjecture that departs from purely distributional models. We will analyze a model
that includes inequality aversion in the utility function, the ERC model of Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000) and a model of linear altruism that follows the one proposed by Ledyard
(1995) and considered by Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1998) for the case of incomplete
information.
Reciprocity has been proposed as a concept that may explain behavior in this
kind of situations where people appear to cooperate more than what would be rational if
players just consider their pecuniary interests. Sugden (1984) introduces a general de¯nition
of reciprocity and Rabin (1993) proposes a model of fairness for simultaneous games that
conceptually could be interpreted as a model of reciprocity, in the sense that an agent may
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be willing to reward expected good intentions and to punish expected bad intentions. We
consider reciprocity as the propensity to reward perceived good intentions and to punish
perceived bad intentions based on observed actions from the other players. Reciprocity is
naturally interpreted when subjects deal with sequential economic situations. Simultaneous
situations need from agents a more sophisticated reasoning based on expectations that may
interact with reciprocity considerations. We think that a simple sequential situation will
allow a direct test of reciprocity considerations.
Also, the paper presents an analysis of group size e®ects for the sequential priso-
ner's dilemma game. We are not aware of any experimental evidence on this e®ect for the
type of games that we use. There is a controversy on the e®ect that changes on the size of
the group providing a public good may have on contributions. An initial conjecture derived
from Olson (1971) was that larger groups would provide the public good less e±ciently1.
On the other hand, group size may be an important issue to have in mind if reciprocity
drives certain behaviors. That is, the propensity to reciprocate some previous action may be
quite di®erent if this previous action have been taken by a small group or by a large group
of people. Following Elster (1989)2, this group size e®ect can arise because of the possible
interpretation of actions by large groups as an increased perceived obligation to reciprocate.
We will implement a simple experimental design that will allow us to analyze this point.
The interest to include this aspect is also that increasing the size of the group allows us
to separate the model of relative concerns used in this paper with the interpretation we
1Though the main economic reasons that Olson provides are neutralized in experiments that study this
issue, for example by keeping the MPCR constant. Olson also argues that "social reasons" will also strenght
the economic reasons to justify that small groups will organize and succeed in providing the public good
more frequently than large groups.
2In Elster's terminology, this is the "norm of fairness". Given the generalized use of the terms "reci-
procity" and "fairness", I continue with the de¯nitions of these concepts used in the Introduction.
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have just given of the interaction between reciprocity considerations and the dimension of
a group.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents part of the accumulated
experimental evidence to motivate the direction of this paper. Section 5.3 incorporates the
framework and derives predictions according to the models of behavior referred to before.
Section 5.4 delineates the experimental design and Section 5.5 presents the results and
discusses the validity of the predictions of the models. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Previous Experiments
There has been extensive research on prisoners' dilemma situations and public
good games. Ledyard (1995) reports that splitting of resources between the public good
and the private good in the ¯rst periods and cooperation rates in the one-shot simultaneous
prisoners dilemma game far from 0% and 100% are consistently found in the literature
and cites relevant communication, MPCR and repetition as the factors that strongly a®ect
behavior. This literature is mainly concerned with simultaneous situations.
A considerable amount of research has been devoted to understand what are possi-
ble explanations for this apparent contradiction between ¯rst period results and the standard
prediction of no cooperation. A possible explanation may be that individuals are altruis-
tic [see for example Ledyard (1995) and Rotemberg (1994) for alternative approaches to
altruism]. Andreoni (1995) designed an experiment to separate errors from altruism as ex-
planations of splitting by paying each player according to the rank of the player's earnings.
He ¯nds that about 50% of the contributions observed in his experiment can be explained
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by altruism or kindness. Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1998) introduce a model that incorpo-
rates errors and altruism to explain behavior observed in these games. Palfrey and Prisbey
(1998) also analyze altruism.
Evidence for another kind of behavior that we can refer to as reciprocal behav-
ior also appears in the experimental literature using games di®erent from the prisoner's
dilemma. Fehr, Gachter and Kirchsteiger (1997) explore it in experimental labor markets,
Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) in the trust game and Croson (1998) in simultaneous
public good games. Croson (1998) tests the explanatory power of altruism versus reci-
procity in simultaneous public good games. She designed several experiments studying the
relationship between the expectation of the other agents' contribution and the individual
contribution in each round, and the other agents' actual contribution and the individual
contribution. Her results show that the subjects' behavior can be interpreted as acting ac-
cordingly to a matching rule and not to a model of altruism by ¯nding positive correlations
for most of the players between the variables mentioned, also in a case where reputation
e®ects are removed. In this last case, the proportion of players that appear to behave
according to reciprocity rules, the minimum of her experiments, is about 70%.
For sequential public good games the experimental literature is less extensive. Erev
and Rapoport (1990) present evidence for sequential step-level prisoner's dilemma games,
where it is rational for some players to cooperate at certain stages. This type of game is nei-
ther equivalent to the linear public good game, nor to a prisoner's dilemma. Dorsey (1992),
and Kurzban, McCabe and Smith (1999) present experimental results with real time revi-
sions of decisions in the context of linear public good games. Dorsey (1992) observes that
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for the linear public good game technology, allowing real time revisions drastically decreases
the contributions and that allowing for revisions just to increase the individual contribu-
tion produces similar results to simultaneous games. Kurzban, McCabe and Smith (1999)
explore further this revision mechanism in a linear public good game to study reciprocity
considerations by individuals. Their consideration of reciprocity includes the basic rule of
matching others' contributions and two modi¯cations: intolerance of defectors and beliefs
about the reciprocity considerations of the other players. Unanimity and expectations,
hence become important and they design an experiment to predict through changing these
two factors, the amount of contributions to the public good. The treatments di®er then in
the information available on the other players announced contributions and the possibility
to increase/decrease contributions or only to increase them. Their main results are that
full information about the others' proposals and an increase-only mechanism for revisions
increase the contributions to the public good and that the mean of the contributions from
the other players is a better predictor of the individual contribution than other measures.
The experimental literature concerning the e®ect of changing the size of the group,
in public good games, in the levels of contribution is not extensive. In simultaneous games,
Isaac and Walker (1988) and Isaac, Walker and Williams (1994) explored the group size
e®ect by means of manipulating the MPCR and the size of the group providing the public
good. Isaac and Walker (1988) designed an experiment with four treatment cells, MPCR
equal to 0.3 or 0.75 and group size equal to 4 or 10. Note that increasing the group size
while keeping the MPCR constant increases the bene¯ts to the group of providing the public
good. The MPCR e®ect was clear and the group size e®ect was ambiguous, in the sense
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that for a low MPCR, a group of 10 people were more successful in providing the public
good but for a high MPCR there was almost no di®erence. The traditional conjecture by
Olson (1971) that large groups would have more di±culties in providing a public good can
be supported by the fact that a low MPCR generates lower contributions. A pure number
e®ect was not found. They continued the research in Isaac, Walker and Williams (1994)
with larger groups, of 40 and 100 subjects. Their main results are that, for low MPCR ,
0.3, groups of size 40 and 100 provide the public good at higher levels of e±ciency than
groups of 4 and 10 subjects and for high MPCR, 0.75 they ¯nd no e®ect of increasing the
group size. On the other hand, the MPCR had no e®ect in these large groups. Anderson,
Goeree and Holt (1998) in their model of altruism and costly errors predict an increase in
total contributions when the size of the group increases.
As we said before, di®erent theories of behavior may explain part of the evidence,
we referred to altruism and reciprocity. Other experiment-based theories that explain a wide
variety of results from di®erent kinds of experiments incorporate a relative payo® compo-
nent in the utility function. Bolton (1991) initially introduced a model that incorporated
a relative payo® consideration in a model of complete information. Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) introduce a model that generalizes the relative payo® concerns of the individual in
a incomplete information setting. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) present a model of inequality
aversion. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) present a model, ERC, that can accommodate dif-
ferent patterns of behavior, including what from their perspective has been interpreted as
reciprocal behavior. They focus on the tension that an individual faces between her own
payo® and a certain preference for collective payo®s. In particular, to explain results of
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cooperative decisions in the sequential prisoner's dilemma game this model assumes that
individuals dislike inequality in the ¯nal distribution of payo®s between agents, thus is a
model that incorporates self-centered inequality aversion. It is important to notice that
inequality refers to one's own payo® with respect to the average payo® in the society. Also,
the individual dislikes equally inequality that favors her and inequality that disfavors her
with respect to the average payo® in the society3. Notice that this argument refers to the
¯nal distribution of payo®s from a given situation and not to the choice process that leads
to this outcome, a process that may have relevant e®ects on the propensity to reciprocate4.
Our approach will consist of analyzing two sequential prisoner's dilemma games
that di®er in the number of subjects playing the game. For these games we can obtain
predictions of behavior in each game and across games for the models of altruism and in-
equality aversion. Altruism generates di®erent predictions from what one would obtain
from reciprocity or inequality aversion considerations in each game. Predictions based in
inequality aversion or considerations of reciprocity are indistinguishable in each game. Reci-
procity and inequality aversion, however can be separated by introducing the comparison
between two games of di®erent sizes, i.e. by increasing the size of the group we can reduce
the inequality generated by a defective action after preceding cooperative actions. This
would induce more defective actions in larger groups after preceding cooperative actions
than in smaller groups. On the contrary, reciprocity considerations could induce players to
cooperate more frequently when a large group of preceding players cooperated.
3This is in contrast to Fehr and Schmidt (1999) that present a similar model where agents dislike more
the inequality that disfavors them.
4Brandts and Solµa (1998) present results where this process is relevant for subjects in simple sequential
situations and reciprocal actions change with the choice process.
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5.3 Models and Predictions
We will use a basic sequential prisoner's dilemma game in which each subject
decides whether to contribute or not to a public good project with all of her resources.
Consider the situation where N individuals are endowed each of them with z monetary units.
Each of these individuals will decide sequentially whether to invest her whole endowment
in a public good, yielding a return of mz to every individual or keeping the endowment for
herself, with a return per unit normalized to 1. Setting m 2 ¡ 1N ; 1¢ we obtain the standard
parametrization of the problem. The payo® to each individual i can be summarized by
the following payo® function, where the contribution to the public good of agent i, xi; is
a binary decision xi 2 f0; zg 8i and we denote the contribution of the rest of the group,
x¡i =
P
j 6=i
xj:
¼i (xi; x¡i) = (z ¡xi) +m
X
(xi+ x¡i) (5.1)
Given that each individual knows the structure of the problem and the decisions
of the previous players, there is a unique SPE where every subject decides to keep her
endowment. This result is clearly ine±cient (recall that m ¢ N > 1).
In this paper we will use both a two-person sequential game and a three-person
sequential game with the same relevant parameters. These games and the speci¯c values of
the parameters are reproduced in Figure 5.1.
We can study this setting on the basis of a modelization that incorporates into the
utility function a inequality aversion concern as proposed by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
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Game 1: Two person sequential prisoner’s
dilemma game.
Game 2: Three person sequential prisoner’s dilemma game.
Figure 5.1: Two-person game and three-person game.
with the ERC model. This model is able to predict a wide variety of results for di®erent
experiments run up to now. It assumes individuals that trade-o® the pecuniary payo® and
the relative payo®5. Moreover, each individual may trade-o® these two forces with di®erent
weights and individual weights are private information. Hence, they present a model of
incomplete information about the preferences of other individuals. We will not make an
extensive analysis of this model, we will rather use it to the situation we described above
to derive the predictions of this model .
5.3.1 Inequality aversion
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) present a general motivation function that describes
the characteristics mentioned above. To compare predictions across di®erent models we
5Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) consider that the relative payo® captures a basic element of the motivation
of individuals. The motivation function includes the pecuniary payo® and the relative payo® through di®erent
functional forms.
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will use a speci¯c motivation function that they propose. This speci¯c function simpli¯es
the analysis and the intuitions while keeping the qualitative characteristics of the general
motivation function. As we said before, the reason to select this motivation function is
that is consistent with reciprocal behavior in the two-person sequential prisoner's dilemma
game. We will adapt their speci¯c motivation function to the notation introduced above.
The motivation function v for individual i is:
vi (¼i;¼¡i) = ai¼i ¡ bi2
µ
¼iP
(¼i +¼¡i)
¡ 1
N
¶2
; 8i (5.2)
Hence, each agent can be characterized by aibi and the authors assume a distribution
F
¡a
b
¢
common knowledge to all agents. Notice that ¼i is de¯ned in Equation 5.1 and that
¼¡i =
P
j 6=i
¼j.
The Perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis for the speci¯c games that we will intro-
duce shortly is left for the Appendix. It is more relevant to mention certain characteristics
of equilibrium behavior and to derive predictions for the games we are interested in.
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) brie°y describe the characteristics of the equilibrium
for the two-person sequential prisoner's dilemma. The second player behavior in equilib-
rium will be never to cooperate after defection from the ¯rst player. The reason being
that this decision will hurt both her monetary payo® and her relative payo®. After ob-
serving cooperation from the ¯rst player, the second mover's decision depends on her type.
A second player will cooperate if she values su±ciently the inequality aversion component
with respect to her payo®. The ¯rst player knows that defection will be responded with
defection, therefore, she has to compare the outcome of full defection with the expected
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gain from cooperating. Inequality aversion considerations would drive to defection because
with defection the agent ensures an equitable outcome, which is not true if she cooperates
(because player 2 can defect). As a consequence, it is the monetary incentive what can
drive the ¯rst mover to cooperate. It is interesting to notice that for the outcome (C, C) to
appear as an equilibrium, the ¯rst player should have a relatively high interest in the pecu-
niary payo®, because a cooperative decision can be understood only due to the individual
pecuniary gain derived from the possible full cooperation outcome if she cooperates with
respect to the sure full defection outcome if she defects (the relative outcome is the same).
In the three-player case, equilibria obey the same reasoning described above. In
equilibrium the only outcome which can be ruled out is cooperation by the third player after
two defections. Any other outcome is possible a priori, depending on the types of players.
A characterization of equilibria in the three-person prisoner's dilemma game is left for the
Appendix.
We will use the two-player game and the three-player game and compare individual
behavior in equilibrium across the two games. This will be used to derive predictions that
will be used as hypotheses to be tested with experimental data. We are mainly interested
in studying how players will behave in the sequential prisoner's dilemma and, in particular,
how behavior may change when the group of players is of di®erent sizes. Therefore, it will
be useful to derive predictions, according to the ERC model.
Since behavior depends on the type of player we face, this generates probabilities
that each player contributes or not at a given node of the game, given complete information
on previous actions. Two kinds of predictions can be derived: intra-game and inter-game.
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By intra-game we mean a comparative analysis of behavior of players in each game. Inter-
game analysis will generate predictions about the di®erences in behavior between players
across games. Not all players will be compared, we will rather focus in some comparisons
that are relevant to study reciprocity considerations.
Claim 5 (ERC-2) a)In the two-player game, the probability of cooperation by player 2
after observing cooperation is equal or higher than the probability of cooperation by player
1. b) The probability of cooperation by player 2 after cooperation is equal or higher than the
probability of cooperation after defection, the later equals to zero. a) P2(C=C) ¸ P2(C): b)
P2(C=C) ¸ P2(C=D) = 0: (The subindex refers to the two-player game).
After observing cooperation by the ¯rst player, the second player can ensure an
egalitarian payo® by cooperating. This, of course, has a monetary cost and the speci¯c type
of the player will determine the probability that she would cooperate in this case. On the
other hand, the ¯rst player can not ensure an egalitarian payo® by cooperating because the
second player can defect, as we just said, and she has the monetary cost of cooperating. As a
consequence, the ¯rst player has less incentives to cooperate because this action can still be
followed by a defection generating inequality. We already mentioned why the second player
will never cooperate after defection. Both her monetary and her relative payo® components
of the utility function drive her towards defection.
Proof: See the appendix.
Claim 6 (ERC-3) In the three-player game, following the reciprocity model, a) The prob-
ability of cooperation by player 3 after observing player 1 and player 2 cooperating is
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equal or higher than the probability of cooperation by player 2 after observing coopera-
tion by player 1 b) The probability of cooperation by player 3 after observing coopera-
tion by player 1 and defection by player 2 is equal or lower than the probability of co-
operation by player 2 after observing cooperation by player 1. c) The probability of de-
fection by player 3 after observing player 1 and 2 defecting is equal to 1. d) The prob-
ability of cooperation by player 3 after a cooperative choice from the ¯rst player and a
defective choice from the second player is equal to the probability of cooperation of the
third player if the order of previous choices is reversed, i.e., player 1 defects and player
2 cooperates a) P3(C=C \ C) ¸ P3(C=C) ¸ P3(C): b) P3(C=C \ D) · P3(C=C): c)
P3(C=C \ C) ¸ P3(C=D \ D) = 0: d) P3(C=C \ D) = P3(C=D \C):
Part a) of the claim follows the argument of the two-player case. Given previous
cooperative actions, subsequent players have more incentives to cooperate because their
cooperative action increases the probability to obtain an equitable payo® with respect to the
previous player for the same monetary cost. Part b) follows because by cooperating after
defection, the second player introduces directly inequality in the distribution of payo®s,
while a cooperative action after cooperation from the ¯rst player can be followed by a
cooperative action from the third player, thus obtaining an egalitarian payo®. c) This part
of the claim follows directly from an extension of the argument developed in the two-player
case. The third player, after observing two defective choices will never cooperate because
this will hurt both her monetary and her relative payo®. Part d) of the claim illustrates the
fact the ERC is insensible to some aspects of the choice process. From player's three point
of view, it is irrelevant the sequence of decisions if the sequences result in the same trade-o®
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between the monetary payo® and the relative payo® component of the utility function.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Claim 7 (ERC 2-3) a) The probability of cooperation of player 3 after observing player 1
and 2 cooperating is lower than the probability of cooperation by player 2 in the two-player
game after cooperation by player 1. b) The probability of cooperation by player 2 in the
three-player game after observing cooperation is smaller than the probability of cooperation
by player 2 in the two-person game after observing cooperation. a)P2(C=C) ¸ P3(C=C\C):
b) P2(C=C) ¸ P3(C=C):
Note that across the two games we keep the MPCR constant, hence the private
incentive for the last player is the same across game. These predictions, hence, come from
the self-centered inequality aversion component of the utility function. The inequality that
could be generated by a defection after a cooperative action in the two player game is higher
than the inequality that would generate a defective action by the third player after two
cooperative actions. The parameters of the game are such that each player contributes to
produce the public good by cooperating, therefore when two of them contribute a defection
has an e®ect which is not as drastic as in the two player case in the decay in e±ciency
and, consequently, inequality decreases. The propensity to cooperate is higher in the player
case to avoid the comparative higher inequality. When we compare the second player in
the games after a cooperative action by the ¯rst player, the previous argument is still valid.
Here the second player will defect more frequently because after a defection is still possible
a cooperative action by the third player that would generate an outcome less unequal. Even
if player three would defect this is the case. Hence, player two in the two player case has
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more incentives to cooperate to avoid this higher inequality.
5.3.2 Altruism
We already mentioned that altruism has been the object of some debate concerning
the possible motivations that lie behind observed behavior in public good games. Altruism
could be de¯ned as a concern for the other players' welfare, with some variations, altruism
has been discussed by Andreoni (1995), Palfrey and Prisbey (1997) and Anderson, Goeree
and Holt (1998), that include warm glow, the satisfaction from the act of contributing.
We will introduce a simple utility function that introduces linearly pure altruism. This
particular form has been adapted from by Ledyard (1995).
ui (¼i; ¼¡i) = ¼i + ®i
X
¼¡i , ®i 2 (0;1] ; 8i: (5.3)
As can be seen, altruism here is introduced as a concern for the payo® of the other
members. The parameter ® indicates the weight that agents give to other's payo®s. We
rule out ® = 0; because in this case we are left with strict egoism, the standard assumption
mentioned above. Suppose that ®i is private information but there exists a distribution
function G (®i) ; common knowledge to all agents.
Claim 8 (Altruism) The probability that a player cooperates in the sequential prisoner's
dilemma is independent of the previous decisions by the other players. b) All players in
the sequential prisoner's dilemma cooperate with the same probability. c) The probability of
cooperation is higher in the three-person prisoner's dilemma than in the two-person priso-
ner's dilemma game. a)P2(C) = P2(C=C) = P2(C=D) · P3(C) = P3(C=C) = P3(C=D) =
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P3(C=C \ C) = P3(C=C \ D) = P3(C=D \ C) = P3(C=D \ D):
Proof: See the Appendix.
We will start with the two-player case to clarify this claim. When deciding whether
to cooperate or defect, player two will trade-o® the monetary loss of cooperation, 1 ¡ m;
with the increase in payo®s to the other members of the group, in this case m: No other
consideration is relevant from the utility function described in 5.3 and this trade-o® is the
same independently of the decision of the previous player. Player 1 hence, will not a®ect the
decision of player two with her decision, so the trade-o® is again the same in any possible
branch of subsequent play, all of them with the same probability to be reached for a given
type of the other player. Consequently, player 1 reduces her problem to the same basic
trade-o® described before for player 2. The reasoning for the three-player case is the same.
The unique di®erence is that now a cooperative action generates a payo® to the group of 2m.
Hence the propensity to cooperate for the same type of player in a 3-player game increases,
because the monetary cost of cooperating is the same, but the payo® to the group increases.
5.4 Experimental design
The benchmark game we use in this paper is a two-person sequential prisoner's
dilemma like the one in Figure 5.1. Observe that, in this game, z = 1500 and m = :6. The
payo®s, expressed in pesetas that appear in this ¯gure will be exactly the same as in the
experiment.
The reason to select a two person prisoner's dilemma, instead of a richer envi-
ronment is that this game allows us to study, in a simple framework, how reciprocity may
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play a role in sequential games. Also, other theories can be addressed and compared with
reciprocity. The players in the experiment will play this simple game once. Moreover, we
will use in the experiment the strategy method. Subjects in the experiment will be asked
to make decisions simultaneously, that is, the ¯rst player will be asked to choose between
A1 and A2 and the second player will be asked to select between B1 and B2 and between
B3 and B4. After decisions are collected, random matching between players of type A (¯rst
movers) and players of type B (second movers) will determine the e®ective outcome that
a given pair reaches in the game. This method will allow us to obtain complete data on
the strategy that the second mover is using in the experiment. This method was ¯rst pro-
posed by Selten (1967) because in sequential situations it allows us to obtain data for every
branch of the game without using deception. Moreover, Brandts and Charness (1999) show
that players, for the same action by a previous mover, do not respond di®erently with the
strategy method.
The second game that we will use in the experiment is a three-person sequential
prisoner¶s dilemma. This game is also represented in Figure 5.1 . Observe that z = 1500
and m = :6, as in the two-player game. We will compare this game with Game 1. This
comparison will allow us to study the e®ects of increasing the group size in a sequential
game on the outcomes of the game and, in particular, on reciprocal behavior. Increasing
the group size to more than three players could be more interesting in order to ¯nd strong
group size e®ects. This game, however, will be used because it is still simple for using
the strategy method. Moving to four-player games or more would increase the number of
decisions for the last player excessively from our point of view. Another possibility could be
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to use a simpli¯ed strategy method in which we would ask each subject to make a decision
for cases that di®er in the number of previous players that cooperated. This method would
ignore the possible e®ects of order and, as a ¯rst step, it seems more appropriate to start
with the strict strategy method6.
We will present the results obtained from four sessions run at the Universitat
Autonoma de Barcelona in April 2000. We recruited students of di®erent majors by posting
billboards in the campus. The billboards asked for university students with the incentive
to obtain some monetary compensation. A total of 157 university students participated in
the experiment. We run two sessions of each of the games presented before. We have 32
groups of two people and 31 groups of three people.
As we have said above, subjects played one of the games presented before once
using the strategy method. The sessions started by assigning randomly players to di®erent
seats in a big classroom. Then subjects had in each seat a set of instructions. The ex-
perimenter read aloud the instructions and, after questions were answered, the assistants,
three people, gave to each subject a decision form. In this decision form each subject could
observe the randomly assigned role in the game. That is, role A or B in the two player
game or role A, B or C in the three player game. Then all subjects simultaneously made
their decisions and the assistants collected them. The experimenter and the assistants then
matched randomly the decision forms of di®erent types of players until completition of the
groups. Since we asked subjects to make their decisions using the strategy method, the next
task was to follow the e®ective decisions in each group, that is we registered the decision of
6If the results in this experiment would show that order of previous decsions is not important, the next
step would be to go from these games to four-player games and ten-player games.
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Two-person game Three-person game
Obs. Rel. Freq. Obs. Rel. Freq.
Full Cooperation 1 0.031 1 0.032
High Cooperation 4 0.129
Low Cooperation 4 0.125 10a 0.322
Full Defection 27 0.843 16 0.516
Total 32 31
Table 5.1: E®ective results of both the two-person and the three-person games
the player with role A, the decision of the player with role B corresponding to the e®ective
decision of A and, in the three-player game, the decision of player C corresponding to the
e®ective decisions of players A and B. After all decisions were registered we paid privately
to each subject and the experiment ended. The sessions lasted between 30 minutes and 45
minutes and subjects' average earnings were approximately $10.
5.5 Results
We ¯rst present the main descriptive results of the experiment. From the e®ective
outcomes of the games, full defection was, by large, the most common result in both games.
In the two-player game this outcome appeared in 27 of the 32 groups, whereas in the three-
player game this proportion goes down to 16 out of 31. Full cooperation just happened once
in each game, therefore partial cooperation succeeded relatively more in the three-player
game, this partial cooperation was more often the result of just one player cooperating.
Table 5.1 presents these results.7
These results show that cooperation is less common in the sequential two-person
7In this table, "low cooperation" means just one player cooperating and high cooperation, just two players
cooperating. a Five of these cases pertain to a subcase where the last player cooperated after two defections.
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prisoner's dilemma than in the three-person game. The reason to use the strategy method
in this experiment is that this data alone do not provide much information on behavior.
Another kind of evidence that can help to get a more reasonable picture of the results
are individual data. From this kind of data, the most clear impression can be derived
from the percentage of behavior according to the standard prediction of no cooperation
in every decision point and for every player8. Figure 5.2 reproduces the percentage of
behavior corresponding to a strategy of defection in every information set. Observe that
these percentages decrease as the order of play increases for both games. In the two-player
game, 87.5% of the ¯rst movers always defect versus a 68.8% of the second players. In the
three-player case, if we move from the ¯rst players to the third players, these percentages
of free-riding are, respectively, 87%, 61% and 48%. In general, the percentage of free-riders
is smaller in the three-player case, 78.1% versus 65.5%. It seems that players deviate from
standard assumptions on behavior and importantly they deviate more as more rich can be
their behavior. We think that this points out at a certain structure in behavior that can be
addressed with di®erent behavioral models.
Table 5.2 presents the complete results of the experiment. Notice that the standard
game theoretical prediction would be a table of zeros. It is apparent that this prediction
is not supported by the data. All but the proportion of cooperative choices by the second
player after defection in the two-player game are signi¯cant at a level of signi¯cance of 1%.
More than this, the reader can observe that there appears to be a certain pattern that would
8As a r¯st approximation, providing free riding behavior may be more transparent than cooperative
behavior. Even if we know what every player chooses in each position, how to interpret ¯srt mover choice
of a cooperative action? it may be because of altruism or inequality aversion considerations. Third mover
"cooperative behavior" also introduces problems of comparison because the possibilities of cooperation are
higher that in the two player case i.e., di®erent strategies could be compatible with a general idea of
"cooperative behavior".
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Figure 5.2: Free-riders per game and position.
indicate the presence of reciprocity in the observed behavior. This apparent success of a
reciprocity based theory however, is poorly signi¯cant. We proceed to examine the speci¯c
predictions presented in the previous section.
Claim 5 (ERC-2) stated the predictions according to the ERC model for the two-
player case. One can observe that the data obtained are consistent with those predictions.
a) The proportion of cooperative choices from the second player after a cooperative choice is
higher than the proportion of cooperative choices from the ¯rst player (0.281 versus 0.125)
though not signi¯cantly. b) The proportion of cooperative choices from the second player
after cooperation is signi¯cantly higher than the proportion after defection (0.281 versus
.0.062) at a 5% signi¯cance level. (Binomial test, p=0.03). c) Finally, the proportion of
103
Two Person Game Three-Person game
Obs. (n=32) Rel. freq. Obs. (n=31) Rel. freq.
C 4 .125 4 .129
C=C 9 .281 12 .387
C=D 2 .062 7 .225
C=C \ C 13 .419
C=C \ D 7 .225
C=D \ C 12 .387
C=D \ D 5 .161
Table 5.2: Observed frequencies of cooperative behavior per game and position.
cooperative choices after defection from the ¯rst player, 0.062, is not signi¯cantly di®erent
from zero.
Claim 6 (ERC-3) stated the research hypotheses of reciprocity for the three-person
game. a) The proportion of cooperation by player 2 after observing cooperation is signi-
¯cantly higher than the proportion of cooperation of player 1 (0.387 versus 0.129) at a
2.5% (p=0.02). Also, the reciprocity model predicted an equal or higher proportion of co-
operative choices by player 3 after observing player 1 and player 2 cooperating than the
proportion of cooperative choices of player 2 after cooperation. The di®erence obtained
in our experiment, 0.387 versus 0.419 does not allow us to reject the null of no di®erence.
b) The proportion of cooperative choices by player 3 after observing player 1 cooperating
and player 2 defecting should be equal or lower than the proportion of cooperative choices
of player 2 after cooperation. We can not reject the null of no di®erence at 10%. c) The
proportion of cooperative choices after two cooperative choices is higher than the propor-
tion of cooperative choices after two defections. The di®erence between both proportions,
0.419 versus 0.161, is signi¯cant at 5%. d) The proportion of cooperative choices from the
third player after a cooperative choice from the ¯rst player and a defective choice from the
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second player is not signi¯cantly higher than the proportion of cooperative choices from the
third player if the order of choices from the previous players is reversed, 0.387 versus 0.225.
This result may have procedural importance for subsequent experiments. This result may
be interpreted by saying that closeness between players seems to a®ect reciprocal actions,
though not signi¯cantly. However, this interpretation should be taken with caution and
probably replicated in a di®erent design. The possible procedural importance is that this
result may preclude to use a simpli¯ed strategy method, by just asking decisions contingent
on number of previous cooperative choices, if larger groups want to be used while keeping
the complexity of decisions at a low level.
Claim 7 (ERC-2-3) stated the predicted di®erences according to the ERC model
due to the change in the size of the group. a) We should expect a proportion of cooperative
choices by the second player after observing cooperation equal or higher than the proportion
of cooperative choices by player three after observing two cooperative choices. The direction
of the data is in the opposite direction, 0.281 versus 0.419, although the opposite directional
hypothesis is not signi¯cant. b) This second part of the claim states that, after observing
cooperation by player 1, we should expect that the proportion of cooperative choices by the
second player would be higher in the two person game. Again, our data go in the opposite
direction. The proportion of cooperative choices after a cooperative action is higher in the
three-person game, 0.387 versus 0.281, but not signi¯cantly. The ERC model used here is
consistent with the data obtained for each game but the comparison between games shows
results that point out a problem of the inequality concerns hypotheses to explain what we
observe.
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Claim 8 (Altruism) stated the research hypotheses that would generate a simple
altruism model. None of them is supported by our data. As we already said the proportion
of cooperative choices appears to be signi¯cantly di®erent in some cases depending on the
previous decisions observed, as the ERC model predicted. Moreover, and closely related,
the order of play appears as an important aspect in the observed proportion of cooperative
choices. Finally, the altruism model generated a prediction of higher probability of cooper-
ation in the three-person game. For some cases, this prediction appears to go in the correct
direction, but not signi¯cantly.
5.6 Conclusions
This paper presents experimental data concerning sequential prisoner's dilemma
games. The objective was to study whether inequality aversion or altruism could account
for the evidence.. We selected a particular model that accommodates reciprocal behavior
in other games, the ERC model of Bolton and Ockenfels (1998), because of its success in
explaining a wide variety of experimental results and a simple model of altruism proposed
by Ledyard (1995). The key of the design was to introduce the group size as an experimental
factor because from our point of view, the size of the group could modify the behavior of
an individual by reciprocity considerations in a way that would not be explained neither by
altruism neither by the inequality aversion model used.
This paper hypothesized that a perceived intention from a group is more in°uen-
tial in behavior than a perceived intention from an individual. The reason being that, in
anonymous exchanges, a group may generate a perceived norm to follow. We do not ob-
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serve intentions and perceptions of intentions, hence we must rely in actions and responses
to certain actions.
The experiments reported in this paper concern two-person and three-person se-
quential prisoner's dilemma games. The main results of this paper point out at two direc-
tions. First, it is observed from the data that reciprocity considerations play a quantitatively
signi¯cant role. The use we make of the ERC model by Bolton and Ockenfels accounts for
the results observed in each game. A simple model of altruism is not consistent with behav-
ior, in particular, altruism does not explain why people respond di®erently to certain actions
from previous players. From the point of view of altruism, a player should be insensible to
what other players did before or what the following players may do in the future.
The second important point that can be concluded from this experiment is that
increasing the number of players in a sequential prisoners dilemma game, even if we just
change the size of the group from two players to three players, has e®ects in behavior.
We observe that increasing the size of the group, even if we just do it from two players to
three players, produces results contradictory with what we should expect from a model that
incorporates inequality aversion, as the ERC model.
When comparing the two-person game and the three-person game, ERC predic-
tions rely on the desire to avoid inequity. Players do not seem to be guided by a desire to
avoid the higher inequality that would generate a defection after a cooperative action in
the two-person prisoner's dilemma game. Though, not signi¯cantly, they cooperate more
in the three-person dilemma game after cooperative actions. While this result may be con-
sistent with a reciprocity consideration, it is not with an inequality aversion consideration.
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Reciprocity may drive the second player in the three-person prisoner's dilemma game to
cooperate after cooperation more than in the two-person game because he/she may expect
the third player cooperating also after cooperation. That is, she may be trying to induce
cooperation by reciprocity. On the other hand, the third player cooperates more after
two cooperative choices than the second player in the two-person game after a cooperative
choice. ERC would predict in this case that the last player in the two-person game would
cooperate more because a defection generates more inequality. Observed behavior, on the
other hand point out at a sensibility to the number of cooperative choices observed. If the
tendencies observed here could be con¯rmed in future research, our pessimistic view of the
model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) could be extented to the the model of inequality
aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), since they assume that the number of players do not
a®ect the individual degree of inequality aversion. On the other hand, Selten and Ockenfels
(1998) found experimental evidence contradictory with pure inequality aversion models that
would incorporate a consideration of the number of players in the utility function.
In conclusion, inequality aversion models like ERC partially accommodate data in
each game presented here and fail to accommodate the observed changes in behavior due to
changes in the group size. To incorporate these results it seems appropriate to incorporate
reciprocity considerations directly in the models. An example of it would be Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (1998). Of course, further research would be also necessary to delineate
what kind of modelization would be desirable.
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5.7 Appendix
5.7.1 Equilibrium behavior according to the ERC model
Three-player prisoner's dilemma analysis. It will be useful to provide a game form
that reproduces the payo®s of the players in the parametric form previously described.
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Figure 5.3: Parametrized three-person game.
Notice that there is incomplete information on others' agents types but these types
are irrelevant to the subsequent players for their decisions. That is, their utility does not
depend upon the type of player that they face. Hence, player three will choose her best
response to each possible information set where she plays, that a practical level is a singleton.
Given these optimal responses, player two will consider her optimal response, at each node
where a decision must be taken. In the same way will be analyzed player's one behavior.
Third Player:
1) Player 1 Defects and Player 2 Defects.
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We compare the utility of player 3 by cooperating (left-hand side) with the utility
from defection (right hand side): Player 3 will cooperate i®:
ma3 ¡ b32
µ
m
2 + 3m
¡ 1
3
¶2
¸ a3: (5.4)
Since a3 and b3 are positive and m < 1, this is a contradiction, so player 3 will
always defect if both player 1 and player 2 defect.
2) Player 1 Defects and Player 2 Cooperates.
Player 3 will cooperate i®:
2ma3 ¡ b32
µ
2m
1 + 6m
¡ 1
3
¶2
¸ (1 + m)a3 ¡ b32
µ
1 + m
2 +3m
¡ 1
3
¶2
: (5.5)
This equation holds if a3b3 · 29(1¡m)(1+6m)2 :
Consequently, player 3 will cooperate in this case with probability
p31 = F
µ
a3
b3
¶
= F
µ
9m2 ¡ 1
6(1 ¡ m)(2 +3m)2(1 + 6m)2
¶
: (5.6)
3) Player 1 Cooperates and Player 2 Defects.
Notice that this case is identical to case 2 because this model does not incorporate
considerations of the decision process. The relevant information is contained in the ¯nal
distribution of payo®s. From this point of view, player three is in the same situation when
one player cooperated and one player defected, irrespectively of who defected and who
cooperated.
Notice that 29(1¡m)(1+6m)2 >
9m2¡1
6(1¡m)(2+3m)2(1+6m)2 ; therefore p32 > p31:
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4) Player 1 Cooperates and Player 2 Cooperates.
Player 3 will cooperate i®:
3ma3 ¸ (1 + 2m) ¡ b32
µ
1 + 2m
1 + 6m
¡ 1
3
¶2
: (5.7)
This equation holds when a3b3 · 9m
2¡1
6(1¡m)(2+3m)2(1+6m)2 : Therefore, player 3 will
cooperate in this case with probability
p32 = F(
a3
b3
) = F(
2
9(1 ¡m) (1 + 6m)2 ): (5.8)
Player 2:
1) Player 1 Cooperates: In this case, player 2 will consider the best responses for
player 3 that apply after cooperation or defection by player 2. Player 2 will cooperate i®:
(3ma2)p32 +
µ
2ma2 ¡ b22
³
2m
1+6m ¡ 13
´2¶
(1 ¡ p32) ¸µ
(1 + 2m)a2 ¡ b22
³
1+2m
1+6m ¡ 13
´2¶
+
µ
(1 + m)a2 ¡ b22
³
1+m
2+3m ¡ 13
´2¶
Observe that if player 2 cooperates, inequality will arise just if player 3 defects
(because if player 3 cooperates the game will end up in the e±cient outcome, which does not
generates inequality), whereas by defecting, since player 1 already cooperated, inequality
will always arise in the utility function. This will drive results in this section.
The previous condition will generate two cases. First if m(p32 ¡ p31 +1) ¡ 1 > 0,
player 2 will cooperate. We will call m(p32 ¡ p31 +1) ¡ 1 = ENGc=c (Expected Net Gain
from Cooperation if player 1 cooperated). If this expected pecuniary payo® is positive,
player 2 will cooperate because in the decision rule described above the expected relative
payo® in the motivation function would drive behavior towards cooperation. The expected
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inequality generated by cooperation is smaller than the expected inequality by defecting.
µ
2m
1 + 6m
¡ 1
3
¶2
(1 ¡ p32) <
µ
1 +2m
1 +6m
¡ 1
3
¶2
p31 +
µ
1 + m
2 + 3m
¡ 1
3
¶2
(1 ¡ p31) (5.9)
To see this inequality, recall that p32 > p31 .Hence, if ENGc=c > 0; both the
monetary payo® and the relative payo® drive behavior towards cooperation.
If m(p32 ¡p31 +1) ¡1 = ENGc=c < 0; then the relative payo® must be important
enough in the motivation function to drive behavior towards cooperation.
From the initial condition in this case, we derive the following extra condition for
cooperation in case that the expected net gain from cooperation is negative.
a2
b2
· 1¡ENGc=c
µ³
1+2m
1+6m ¡ 13
´2
p31 +
³
1+m
2+3m ¡ 13
´2
(1 ¡ p31) ¡
³
2m
1+6m ¡ 13
2´
(1 ¡ p32)
¶
= A
In this case, the probability that player 2 cooperates when player 1 cooperated
and the expected net gain from cooperation is negative is p22 = F
³
a2
b2
´
= F (A) :
2) Player 1 Defects: Player 2 will cooperate in this case i®:µ
2ma2 ¡ b22
³
2m
1+6m ¡ 13
´2¶
p31 +
µ
ma2 ¡ b22
³
m
2+3m ¡ 13
´2¶
(1 ¡ p31) ¸
a2
Notice that if player 2 defects, the game will end up in the full free riding outcome
because player 3 will always defect after player 1 and player 2 defect. Moreover, the relative
payo® part of the motivation function will drive behavior towards defection, because the
full free riding outcome is fully egalitarian, whereas a cooperative action by player two will
always generate inequality. Hence, to obtain cooperation by player two in this case, it is
necessary a player su±ciently motivated by the pecuniary payo® that she may obtain by
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cooperating. This means that the Expected Net Gain from cooperation must be positive,
that is, ENGC=D = 2mp31 + m (1 ¡ p31) ¡ 1 > 0 it is necessary condition for cooperation.
Moreover, it is also necessary that
a2
b2
¸ 12ENGC=D
³
p31 19(1+6m)2 + (1 ¡ p31) 49(2+3m)2
´
:
So, if ENGC=D > 0; the probability that player 2 cooperates when player 1 de-
fected is:
p21 = 1 ¡ F
³
a2
b2
´
= 1 ¡F
³
1
2ENGC=D
³
p31 19(1+6m)2 + (1 ¡ p31) 49(2+3m)2
´´
Player 1:
Case 1: ENGC=C = m(p32 ¡ p31 + 1) ¡ 1 < 0
ENGC=D = 2mp31 + m (1 ¡ p31) ¡ 1 > 0
Player 1 will incorporate the optimal rules of player 1 and player 2 into her decision
problem. Player 1 will cooperate i®:
3ma1p22p32 +
µ
2ma1 ¡ b12
³
2m
1+6m ¡ 13
2´
¶
[p22 (1 ¡ p32) + (1 ¡ p22)p31]+µ
ma1 ¡ b12
³
m
2+3m ¡ 13
´2¶
(1 ¡ p22)(1 ¡ p31) >·
(1 + 2m)a1 ¡ b12
³
1+2m
1+6m ¡ 13
2´
¸
p21p31+·
(1 + m)a3 ¡ b12
³
1+m
2+3m ¡ 13
2´
¸
p22 (1 ¡ p31) +
a3(1 ¡ p21) = B:
This inequality turns out to be the following two conditions for cooperation:
ENGC = p22(p32 ¡ p31 +1) ¡ p21m(1 + p31) + (mp31 + m ¡ 1) > 0
and
a1
b1
¸ 12ENGC
h
p22 1¡p329(1+6m)2 + (1 ¡ p22)
³
p31
9(1+6m)2 +
4(1¡p31)
92+3m)2
´
¡ p21
³
4p31
9(1+6m)2
+ 1¡p319(2+3m)2
´i
:
The probability that a player 1 one will cooperate will be p1 = 1 ¡F
³
a1
b1
´
:
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Case 2: ENGC=C = m(p32 ¡ p31 + 1) ¡ 1 > 0
ENGC=D = 2mp31 + m (1 ¡ p31) ¡ 1 > 0
Player 1 will incorporate the optimal rules of player 1 and player 2 into her decision
problem. Player 1 will cooperate i®:
3ma1p32 +
µ
2ma1 ¡ b12
³
2m
1+6m ¡ 13
´2¶
(1 ¡ p32) > B:
This generates two additional necessary conditions for cooperation:
ENG¤C = m(p32 + 2 ¡ p21p31 ¡ p21) ¡ 1 > 0 and
a1
b1 ¸ 12ENG¤C
h
1
9(1+6m)2 (1 ¡ p32) ¡ p21
³
4p31
9(1+6m)2
+ 1¡p319(2+3m)2
´i
:
In this case, the probability that player 1 would cooperate would be p¤1 = 1¡F(a1b1 ):
5.7.2 Proof of Claim 5:
We will proof the claim by comparing what player 1 would obtain by cooperating
in the case that player 2 would cooperate with certainty and in the case that player would
defect with certainty.
Player 2 cooperates with certainty:
Net monetary gain from cooperation: m ¡ 1
Inequality change by cooperation: 1+m1+2m ¡ 12
Player 2 defects with certainty:
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Net monetary gain from cooperation: m ¡ 1
Inequality change by cooperation: ¡
³
m
1+2m ¡ 12
´
Player 2:
If player 1 cooperates, then:
Net monetary gain from cooperation: m ¡ 1
Inequality change by cooperation: 1+m1+2m ¡ 12
Observe that player 1 has the same incentives to cooperate than player 2 (after
observing cooperation) if player 2 would cooperate with certainty but less incentives if
player 2 would defect with certainty. In this last case, the monetary incentive is the same
but player one creates inequality by cooperating. The inequality aversion, then drives this
result. Player 2 will cooperate with probability p22 (obtained above) This means that, in
any case, player 1 will cooperate less often than player 2.
The second part of the claim, that states that player two will defect for sure
after observing defection is justi¯ed because by cooperating player two looses 1 ¡m, and,
moreover, creates inequality. Hence, both parts of the utility function drive behavior towards
defection.
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5.7.3 Proof of Claim 6:
a) This part of the claim states that the probability of cooperation by player 3 after
observing player 1 and player two cooperating, is higher than the probability of cooperation
by player 2 after observing cooperation by player 1.
As before, we will compare the incentives to cooperate of both players in the
di®erent situations.
Player 2:
If player 3 would cooperate with certainty, the incentives to cooperate by player 2
would be:
Net monetary gain from cooperation: m ¡ 1
Inequality change by cooperation: ¡
³
1+2m
1+6m ¡ 13
´
If player 3 would defect with certainty:
Net monetary gain from cooperation: m ¡ 1
Inequality change by cooperation:
³
2m
1+6m ¡ 13
´
¡
³
1+m
2+3m ¡ 13
´
Player 3:
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Net monetary gain from cooperation: m ¡ 1
Inequality change by cooperation: ¡
³
1+2m
1+6m ¡ 13
´
Observe that the incentives of player 2 to cooperate are equal or smaller than
the incentives that player 3 has. Since player with cooperate with certain probability after
player's 2 possible decision to cooperate, we deduce the statement of part a9 of the claim.
b) This second part of the claim states that the probability of observing coopera-
tion by player 3 after player cooperated and player 2 defected is smaller than the probability
of observing cooperation by player 2 after cooperation by player 1. We will look just at the
incentives that face player 3 because player 2's incentives are the same as in the previous
case.
Player 3:
Net monetary gain from cooperation: m ¡ 1
Inequality change by cooperation:
³
2m
1+6m ¡ 13
´
¡
³
1+m
2+3m ¡ 13
´
Notice that in this case player 3 has the same or smaller incentives, hence the
probability of observing cooperation by player 3 in this case is smaller than probability of
observing cooperation by player 2 after player 1 cooperated.
c) This part was proved above when describing equilibrium behavior.
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5.7.4 Proof of Claim 7:
a) Supposing the distribution function F
³
ai
bi
´
does not change with the number
of players, we can compare the probabilities of cooperation between games. The monetary
incentive to cooperate for both players is the same, 1 ¡m: On the other hand, the relative
payo® component is not the same:
Reduction in inequality by cooperating: Player 3 (3 -player case): 1+m1+2m ¡ 12
Reduction in inequality by cooperating: Player 2 (2 -player case): 1+2m1+6m ¡ 13
Direct inspection shows that the inequality reduction is higher in the two player
case for m > 110: Recall that we set m = :6, therefore player 2 in the two-player case will
cooperate with higher probability.
b) Remember that we have shown that P2(C=C) ¸ P3(C=C \ C): Moreover, in
Claim 6 (ERC-3) we showed that P3(C=C \ C) ¸ P3(C=C): Hence, P2(C=C) ¸ P3(C=C):
5.7.5 Proof of Claim 8:
Given the utility function de¯ned, the equilibrium characterization is similar to
the one used with the reciprocity model. We will analyze the equilibrium behavior by using
backwards induction.
We will start ¯rst with the two player case.
Second player:
a) If player 1 cooperated, player 2 would cooperate i®:
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2m + ®22m ¸ 1 + m +®2m =) ®2 ¸ 1 ¡ mm :
The probability that player 2 cooperates in this case is p21 = 1 ¡ G ¡1¡mm ¢ :
b) If player defected, player 2 would cooperate i®:
m + ®2 (1 + m) ¸ 1 +®2 =) ®2 ¸ 1 ¡mm :
Hence, the probability of cooperation is the same in this case. We will call this
common probability p2 = 1 ¡ G(1¡mm ):
First Player:
The ¯rst player will cooperate i®:
(2m +®12m)p2 + (1 +m + ®1m)p2 + (m + ®1 (1 + m)) (1 ¡ p2) ¸ (1 +®1) (1 ¡ p2)
=) ®1 ¸ 1¡mm :
Hence, the probability that player 1 cooperates equals the probability that player
2 cooperates, p1 = p2: We will call this probability bp = 1 ¡G(1¡mm )
Three-player game
Third Player:
a) If Player 1 cooperated and player 2 cooperated:
Player 3 will cooperate i®:
3m +®36m ¸ (1 +2m) + ®34m: (5.10)
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So, player 3 will cooperate in this case whenever:
®3 ¸ 1 ¡ m2m : (5.11)
The probability that player 3 cooperates in this case is pa31 = 1 ¡ G
¡
1¡m
2m
¢
:
b) If Player 1 cooperated and player 2 defected:
The condition for cooperation is:
2m +®3 (1 +4m) ¸ (1 + m) +®3 (1 + 2m) (5.12)
This generates the condition of equation 5.11. So the probability of cooperation
in this case is pa32 = pa31:
c) If player 1 defected and player 2 cooperated:
This case is analogous to the previous one, consequently the condition is the same
and the probability of cooperation, pa33 = pa32 = pa31:
d) If both player 1 and player 2 defect, player 3 will cooperate i®:
m +®3 (2 +2m) ¸ 1 +2®3 (5.13)
The condition on ®3 is the same as the previous conditions and, hence, the prob-
ability of cooperation in this case, pa34 = pa33 = pa32 = pa31:
This proves that player 3 will cooperate always with same probability, we will call
this probability pa3:
Second Player:
a) If player 1 cooperated, player two would cooperate when:
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(3m +®26m)p3 + (2m + ®2 (1 + 4m)) (1 ¡ p3) ¸ (1 + 2m + ®24m) p3+
(1 + m +®2 (1 +2m)) (1 ¡ p3)
The condition on ®2 is:
®2 ¸ 1 ¡ m2m
The probability of cooperation for player 2 in this case is pa21 = 1 ¡G
¡ 1¡m
2m
¢
:
b) If player 1 defected, player 2 would cooperate if:
(2m +®2 (1 +4m))pa3 + (m + ®2 (2 + 2m)) (1 ¡ pa3) ¸ (1 +m + ®2 (1 +2m))pa3+
(1 +®22) (1 ¡ pa3)
This condition reduces to the same condition on ®2 as in the previous case. Hence,
the probability of cooperation in this case is equal to the probability of cooperation when
player 1 cooperated, pa22 = pa21: As was stated in Claim 1, the second player also cooperates
with the same probability, whatever the action of player 1. We will call this probability
pa2: Moreover, observe that this probability is the same that the probability that player 3
cooperates. To simplify notation, we will call this common probability pa¡1
c) Player 1 will cooperate i®:
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(3m +®14m)p2¡1 +(1 + 2m + ®14m)p2¡1+
2 (2m +®1 (1 + 4m)) (p¡1 (1 ¡ p¡1))+
+(m +®1 (2 +2m)) (1 ¡ p¡1)2 ¸ 2(1 + m + ®1 (1 +2m)) (p¡1 (1 ¡ p¡1))+
(1 +2®1) (1 ¡ p¡1)2
This condition can be rewritten as ®1 ¸ 1¡m2m : Therefore player 1 cooperates with
same probability that player 2 and player 3. We call this probability ep = 1 ¡G(1¡m2m ):
From this analysis we get results a) and b) stated in Claim 1. If we consider the
formalization of altruism introduced here, all players in each game cooperate with the same
probability, independently of the previous players' decisions.
Part c) of Claim 1 can be checked easily by noting that ep ¸ bp: That is, the
probability of cooperation by any player in the sequential 3-person prisoner's dilemma is
higher than the probability of cooperation in the two-person game.
1 ¡m
2m
<
1 ¡ m
m
=) ep = 1 ¡Gµ1 ¡ m
2m
¶
¸ 1 ¡G
µ
1 ¡m
m
¶
= bp:
5.7.6 Written instructions for the two-person sequential game
GENERAL:
Welcome. The object of this session is to study how people make decisions in a
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given situation. At any time you can raise your hand and a monitor will come to answer
your questions. From now on, it's important that you do not communicate with other
people in this session. The number that appear in this folder will be used to pay you at the
end of the session.
In this session you will make money. This money will be paid to you at the end.
Payments are con¯dential: no other participant in this session will know how much money
you make.
Half of the people that came today will play the role of A and the rest will play
the role B. In this session you will be paired with another person with a di®erent role from
your own role. Nobody will know the identity of the other person in his/her pair.
DECISION TASKS:
In each pair there will be a participant with role A and a participant with role B.
The money you'll make depends on your decisions and the decisions of the other participant
in your pair, and nobody will know at the time of taking decisions what the decisions
if his/her pair are. The participant designated as A will make a decision between two
alternatives: A1 or A2. The participant designated as B will make two decisions. B will
not know what person A decides, hence B will make a decision for each possible election
of A. B will decide between B1 or B2 for the case in which A would have chosen A1 and
B will decide between B3 and B4 for the case in which A would have chosen A2. Each
combination of decisions between the two participant in a pair results in di®erent payments
in pesetas for each member in the pair. The ¯nal result will follow the e®ective decisions of
both participants.
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In order to illustrate the situation, the following graphical representation describes
how is the decision process and you will be able to see the consequences of the decisions of
both participant in a pair in terms of payments in pesetas.
(Here a representation of Game 1)
Explanation of the graphical representation:
The letters A and B that appear in the graph indicate where the decision for each
member takes places.
The participant with role A decides between A1 and A2.
The person with role B chooses between B1 and B2 for the case in which A would
have chosen A1 and chooses between B3 and B4 for the case in which a would have chosen
A2.
The pairs of numbers that appear in the inferior part of the graph indicate the
consequence of each pair of decisions. The number above corresponds to payment in pesetas
for A and the number below to the payment in pesetas for B. Hence, if A chooses A1 and
B chooses B1 in that case, participant A gets pta. 1500 and participant B gets pta. 1500,
whatever the decision of B for the case in which A would have chosen A2. (etcetera for each
combination in the instructions).
As you can see, your decisions and the decisions of the other member in your pair
determine the payment that each member will receive.
It's very important that you understand perfectly how the process of decisions
imply payments in pesetas. If at this point, you are not con¯dent with it, you can raise
your hand and a monitor will clarify the situation.
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE SESSION:
When everybody will ¯nish to read and revise the instructions, decision tasks will
start. The monitors will give a decision form to each participant in the session. In this
registration form it will appear your identi¯cation number and the role that you have been
assigned, A or B. In this decision form there will be a graphical representation identical
to the one explained before. You will use this decision form to register the decisions that
you will choose according to your role. That is, if you have role A you will have to choose
between A1 or A2 marking the letter corresponding to the alternative that you prefer in
the graphical representation. If you have assigned role B, you must mark either B1 or B2
for case in which A would have chosen A1 and you should also mark either B3 or B4 for
the case in which A would have chosen A2.
After decisions have been made, you will be able to ¯ll the receipt with your
personal data. You can not put in the receipt the amount of money that we pay you
because you still don't know it.
The monitors will get all the decisions form from participant and they will proceed
in the following way: they will mix the decision forms from participants with role of A and,
separately, those with the role of B. Then they will select one decision form of each type
randomly until all pairs will be completed. After this process is completed they will observe
for each pair what is the decision of the participant A and what is the decision of participant
B that corresponds to the decision of A. So that the complete sequence of e®ective decisions
can be completed. When this process will be ¯nished for all pairs, monitors will call apart
each participant (identi¯ed by the personal identi¯cation number in the folder). Each
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participant will take the folder with all pages inside all she/he will paid individually.
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